AI Agent Breaches Australian Government System

The Australian Government has revealed that an artificial intelligence agent developed by OpenAI gained unauthorised access to a government website containing Medicare statistics, highlighting a new and potentially significant cybersecurity threat for critical infrastructure operators.
The incident occurred in June when an AI agent was given what was described as a benign task to research Australian health and medical statistics. While interacting with several government websites, the agent encountered the Medicare Statistics Reporting Service portal. When information it sought was not provided, the agent subsequently found a way to gain unauthorised access to the system.
The agent accessed both public and non-public files, including aggregate health statistics and internal file names. Australian authorities currently say there is no evidence that personal Medicare records were accessed, and a forensic investigation remains underway.
The significance of the incident, however, extends beyond the data involved. It demonstrates how increasingly autonomous AI systems can interact with external websites and systems, adapt when their initial requests are unsuccessful, and potentially discover security weaknesses without being explicitly instructed to do so. Australian officials have described the incident as the first known case of an AI agent gaining unauthorised access to an Australian Government IT system.
For critical infrastructure operators, the incident provides an important warning. AI-enabled threats do not necessarily require an attacker to deliberately direct an AI system towards a specific target. Autonomous agents may be capable of reconnaissance, navigating websites, interpreting information, attempting alternative approaches and interacting with systems at a speed and scale that is difficult for conventional security controls to anticipate.
As organisations increasingly introduce AI agents into operational, corporate and security environments, questions around permissions, network segmentation, authentication, monitoring, sandboxing and human oversight become increasingly important.
The Australian incident therefore raises a broader question for critical infrastructure operators: if an AI agent can unexpectedly cross a security boundary while performing a legitimate task, are existing security controls designed to recognise and contain that behaviour?
The incident remains under investigation, but it provides a timely reminder that the security implications of AI extend beyond how organisations use the technology. AI itself is becoming an active participant in the cyber environment – creating new opportunities, but also new attack surfaces and unpredictable behaviours that critical infrastructure operators will need to understand and manage.

CISA Publish Updated Insider Threat Mitigation Guide

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released a newly updated Insider Threat Mitigation Guide. This effort continues CISA’s commitment to raising awareness of risks posed by insider threats to the Nation’s critical infrastructure and empowering our partners with effective mitigation strategies for these threats.
Originally published by CISA in late 2020, the Guide has been updated in response to frequent partner requests for expanded guidance on this critical topic. The Guide provides critical infrastructure stakeholders with practical information about insider threats, their various forms, and recommended practices for developing or improving mitigation programs. An established program serves to protect key assets, prevent violence, minimize unintentional incidents, reduce losses related to revenue or intellectual property, safeguard sensitive data, and save lives.
Key updates in the Guide include:
• New case studies, statistics, and improvements designed to enhance the original content, streamline information delivery, and ensure continued relevance
• Expanded insights on emerging workplace trends such as increased hybrid and remote work, advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), and other pertinent considerations relating to insider threats
• Access to newly released CISA resources supporting preparedness and early risk detection
What’s Inside:
- Types of Insider Threats: Learn about intentional and unintentional insider threats in an organization.
- Detection Strategies: Identify behaviors and indicators of potential insider incidents.
- Assessment Guidelines: Best practices for insider threat assessments to inform mitigation strategies.
- Threat Management: Intervention best practices balancing organizational protection and individual care.
- Mitigation Program: Steps to create or improve an insider threat mitigation program.
Resources: Tools, resources, and a glossary for program development.
CISA published the updated guide to coincide with National Insider Threat Awareness Month (NITAM). Each September, NITAM brings together security professionals from government and industry to promote detection, assessment, and proactive management of insider threats.

CISA, FBI, and International Partners Release Guidance on Effective Communication During Service Outages

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and international partners, released joint guidance Communicating Under Pressure: Best Practices for Service Providers to help organizations plan to communicate clearly and effectively during service outages impacting IT and operational technology (OT) systems.
Whether caused by cyber threat actors, human error, equipment failure, or natural hazards, service outages can create disruption and societal panic even without speculation from end users and the public as added factors. Outages at one organization may cascade across interconnected systems, increasing the uncertainty and potential for panic. This guidance describes how service providers can prepare and execute clear, timely, and audience-appropriate messaging that articulates accurate information while still aligning with operational security, law enforcement, and containment efforts.
Key actions for communicating during service outages:
• Lead with confirmed facts, scope, and affected systems
• Tailor updates to each audience
• State what is known, unknown, and under investigation
• Explain operational impact and any customer actions
• Avoid vague language, speculation, and public relations “spin”
• Provide frequent, time-stamped updates
• Align messaging with legal, regulatory, and law enforcement requirements
CISA’s CI Fortify initiative provides information and resources that help critical infrastructure organizations prepare to isolate and recover their vital OT systems during a major cyber incident or crisis. Changes in service availability, whether from outages or isolation as a defensive strategy, require transparent and ongoing communication to help end users minimize operational impact, limit speculation, and preserve trust. For emergency planning purposes, critical infrastructure owners and operators should assume that telecommunications services may be disrupted or otherwise unreliable, making it crucial for organizations to have crisis communications plans in place that integrate backup communication methods and understand the type of communication they should expect from their service providers.

INTERPOL report finds AI linked to more than half of cybercrime in Africa

Artificial intelligence is enabling 55 per cent of reported cybercrimes across Africa making attacks faster, more scalable, and increasingly difficult for victims and platforms to detect, according to INTERPOL’s African Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2026.

With more than 1.1 billion mobile subscribers recorded in 2025, Africa’s digital transformation is expanding rapidly.

However, cybercrime legislation is fragmented and AI readiness in law enforcement agencies remains alarmingly low.

The 40-page report draws on survey data from 36 African member countries and highlights a defining shift: cyber-criminality has evolved from isolated incidents into an industrialized, borderless ecosystem.

East Africa emerged as a hub of mobile money fraud and infrastructure-targeted ransomware.

Business email compromise and romance scams targeting both corporate and individual victims were prolific in Central and West Africa.

Southern Africa’s ultra-high connectivity makes it a magnet for global threat actors seeking maximum disruption.

The financial toll of cybercrime in Africa is significant.

Since 2024, cybercrime-related losses have more than doubled, from USD 192 million to USD 484 million, driven primarily by AI-facilitated scams, credential harvesting, and automated social engineering campaigns.

According to the report, in 2025, online scams continued to be the most reported type of cybercrime, with attackers leveraging mobile money platforms, social media and AI to reach their targets.

Notably, 72 per cent of surveyed countries reported the presence of scam centres, with the highest concentration in Southern and West Africa.

AI-enabled cyberthreats
Digital sextortion and online harassment, often facilitated by AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic media, remained pervasive, with some 600,000 sextortion detections recorded by TrendAI, one of several partners working with INTERPOL.

Similarly, the sophistication of Business E-Mail Compromise (BEC) schemes increased dramatically, with AI used to generate highly convincing e-mail correspondence, with Africa-based threat actors targeting victims in Europe and North America using infrastructure located across multiple jurisdictions.

The report reveals that the absence of real-time, inter-agency data sharing between banks, telecoms and law enforcement creates a dangerous blind spot in efforts to combat financial fraud.

This vulnerability is being exploited by criminals who have moved beyond simply stealing existing credentials to creating entirely synthetic identities.

Combining real personal data with fabricated elements, these AI-generated digital personas can bypass even advanced biometric verification systems and have been used to open bank accounts, secure mobile loans and register SIM cards under false names.

Neal Jetton, Director of INTERPOL’s Cybercrime unit said, “Cybercrime has emerged as one of the most significant criminal threats to the region. AI is automating every stage of a cyberattack from reconnaissance and phishing to extortion and evasion.

“However, we see that when countries work together, cybercriminal infrastructure can be identified, disrupted and dismantled.”

Meaningful transnational progress is visible. In 2025, 17 countries enacted or amended cybercrime legislation, including the launch of an online reporting platform in Senegal aimed at enhancing the response to online violations affecting children.

At the same time, regionally coordinated capacity building initiatives continue to strengthen long-term cyber resilience.

Operational cooperation is also delivering noteworthy results.

Four high impact cybercrime operations coordinated by INTERPOL including Operation Serengeti 2.0, Operation Contender 3.0, Operation Sentinel and Operation Red Card 2.0 collectively led to more than 1,500 arrests, the seizure of hundreds of devices and the recovery of over USD 100 million.

In its recommendations, the report calls for standardized digital forensic capabilities, enhanced cross-border cooperation, investment in AI literacy among law enforcement officers and formal-public private partnership to support effective prevention, detection and response.

CISA Urges Water and Wastewater Systems Sector to Protect OT Against Activity Targeting PLCs

CISA is currently observing a significant increase in cyber threat actors targeting programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in the Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector. CISA urges critical infrastructure owners, operators, and integrators to remove publicly exposed PLCs and other operational technology (OT) from the internet as soon as possible. Threat actors targeting exposed PLCs have modified passwords to lock out operators and disconnected the PLCs by changing their IP addresses. This activity has resulted in boil water notices and sustained manual operations.

These threat actors are targeting water entities of all sizes. Even water organizations with mature cybersecurity processes should validate their external connections, as this targeting activity includes cellular modems installed by operators, vendors, or system integrators that may not be documented or included in routine attack surface scans. OT assets exposed to the internet have an increased risk of defacement, configuration changes, operational disruptions, and, in severe cases, physical damage.

CISA recommends organizations implement the following mitigations:

- Disconnect the PLC from the internet. Remote access for operational purposes should go through a VPN or gateway device, not directly to the PLC.
- Enable password protection and change default passwords.
- Allowlist IPs to only allow remote access from known engineering laptops or other critical OT assets.

After disconnecting PLCs from the internet, operators should ensure they have a known clean backup of the PLC image in case they are locked out by a modified password. Note: Owners, operators, and integrators of Rockwell Automation MicroLogix 1400 PLCs should see Rockwell Automation’s IMPORTANT NOTICE: Restoring Access to a MicroLogix™ 1400 Controller When the Password Is Unknown for guidance addressing this activity.

To securely enable remote access to your OT systems, CISA recommends system owners, operators, and integrators see the following resources for guidance:

- CISA: Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology
- United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Center: Secure Connectivity Principles for Operational Technology
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Malicious Cyber Actors Targeting Water and Wastewater Sector Internet Facing Programmable Logic Controllers, Causing Operational Disruptions

For additional support, contact the Environmental Protection Agency’s Cybersecurity Technical Assistance Program for the Water Sector.

Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE), United States Cyber Command – Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) released an updated joint Cybersecurity Advisory Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure.

This update re-emphasizes the ongoing threat from Iranian-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) actors targeting internet-connected operational technology (OT) devices, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs) manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other brands/manufacturers. These attacks have resulted in operational disruptions and financial losses across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Services and Facilities, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Energy.

What’s New in This Update:

• Expanded Targeting: The advisory now includes observed targeting of Schneider Electric and Siemens PLCs, in addition to Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley and potentially other branded/manufacturer devices.
• Updated Technical Details: New information on threat actor tactics, including use of configuration software to exfiltrate device project files, and expanded details on targeted ports and device models.
• Enhanced Mitigations: Additional recommendations for securing cellular modems, implementing isolated architectures, validating project files, and detecting malicious changes in reusable code modules (such as Add-On Instructions/AOIs).
• New Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): Updated tables of internet protocol (IP) addresses and timeframes associated with Iranian-affiliated APT activity.

Iranian-affiliated APT actors continue to adapt their tactics, targeting a wider range of devices and sectors. Proactive review of this advisory and implementation of the recommended mitigations are critical to defending your organization’s OT assets and ensuring operational resilience.

NATO PA Promotes Investment in Collective Defence, Infrastructure Protection

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has highlighted legislators’ vital role in ensuring the Atlantic Alliance faces up to pressing security challenges, strengthening collective defence and protecting against hybrid threats.
The Assembly’s Spring Session drew over 230 lawmakers from NATO and partner nations. Discussions on the second day focused on issues ranging from safeguarding critical infrastructure, maintaining military force levels and fast-tracking defence innovation
“The war in Ukraine is driving new thinking about modern warfare,” explained US Congressman Rick Larsen. “Innovating quickly is important but integrating and scaling new technologies is just as essential.
Drawing on Ukraine’s experience of fast-paced wartime innovation, Larsen said NATO must work urgently to overcome years of underinvestment, insufficient and fragmented demand, slow procurement and overly bureaucratic acquisition systems.
“That’s where we come in,” he told fellow parliamentarians. “We control the budgets. We conduct oversight. We can demand answers when promising technologies stall. We can push governments to integrate NATO commitments into national legislation and procurement systems that work.”
A presentation by Greek member Spyridon Kyriakis centred on shaping NATO’s future forces by improved recruitment, retention of experienced military personnel and strengthening the will to fight within Allied societies.
Faced with an aggressive, expansionist Russia on its doorstep, NATO must take steps to meet recruitment targets and ensure personnel stay in uniform longer, particularly those with critical skills such as cyber, intelligence, logistics and special operations.
“We need a sweeping renewed conversation on how we value, support and inspire our forces,” Kyriakis told the Assembly.
New NATO defence plans, bigger budgets and arms acquisition “can only deliver real deterrence if the Alliance has the well-trained, highly motivated men and women needed to operate and sustain them,” he added.
Lawmakers debated the costs and benefits of conscription and emphasised the importance of building on Ukraine’s experience to build public support and societal resilience to shape mobilisation capacity and wartime outcomes.
“As parliamentarians ... we hold the levers of oversight, the power of legislation and the loudest microphones to champion the profound value of military service to our citizens,” Kyriakis concluded.
Ahead of July’s summit of NATO leaders in Ankara, lawmakers highlighted the role of parliaments in ensuring that Allies stick to the goal of spending at least 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence and security.
“There is still much to be done to bring defence spending to 5% of GDP and transfer that money into actual operational deterrence and defence capabilities,” said Dutch Senator Bart Kroon. “Sustaining that level of spending and transformation will require trade-offs and smart policymaking.”
NATO PA speakers underscored the need to protect critical infrastructure, such as undersea and space assets, from the mounting risk of hybrid attacks.
“Allied security is increasingly dependent upon our space systems and undersea infrastructure,” stated US Congressman Mike Turner. “They are core components of our defence posture and our economic resilience; and are under growing pressure from our adversaries.”
Turner and British Member Lord Nigel Dodds made presentations urging better monitoring and attribution of threats to infrastructure, faster repair and replacement options and solutions that allow forces to operate when communications are degraded by adversaries. Cooperation with the private sector is essential.
“Parliaments and we, as parliamentarians, have an important role to play,” said Dodds. “We can help ensure that national legal frameworks are fit for purpose. We can scrutinise whether governments have clear lead authorities and effective coordination structures. We can support dedicated funding for protection, repair, and response; and we can help keep political attention on this issue before a major disruption occurs.”

NIST SP 1800-41, Responding to and Recovering from a Cyber Attack

The NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) has released the initial public draft of NIST Special Publication 1800-41, Responding to and Recovering from a Cyber Attack: Cybersecurity for the Manufacturing Sector, which provides guidelines on response and recovery activities in an industrial control system (ICS) environment and recommendations to improve operational resilience. The comment period for this publication is open through July 8, 2026.
Background
As Operational Technology (OT) systems like ICS become more interconnected with IT networks, they are increasingly being targeted by cyber threats, putting factory operations, safety, and property at risk. Organizations operating these systems, such as those in the manufacturing sector, need to have plans and capabilities in place to respond to cyber incidents and restore operations to improve overall resilience.
The NCCoE worked with 11 industry collaborators to develop reference architectures, describe response and recovery scenarios, and demonstrate relevant approaches and capabilities.
This draft publication provides actionable guidelines on responding to and recovering from cyber attacks in manufacturing environments. Discover how to:
- Understand the risks and potential impact of cyber incidents on your operations
- Develop a comprehensive response and recovery plan
- Implement best practices to minimize downtime and restore operations quickly

CISA Announces Revised Town Hall Schedule to Engage with Stakeholders on Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) today announced a revised schedule for a series of virtual town hall meetings to gather stakeholder input on the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) rulemaking. Scheduled to begin June 15, these town hall meetings replace the town hall meetings previously scheduled for March and April 2026, but which CISA was not able to hold due to the recent Democrat shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
CISA remains committed to affording stakeholders the opportunity to provide additional input on the CIRCIA rulemaking through a town hall series before the rule is finalized. The revised schedule is available in the Federal Register. Interested stakeholders may register for the town hall meetings at www.cisa.gov/circia. Any changes or updates to the town halls will be available on www.cisa.gov/circia.
“CISA is working to maximize the impact of CIRCIA to significantly improve our Nation’s cybersecurity posture. At the same time, CISA values the interest and concern our stakeholders have that CIRCIA will be implemented with minimal unnecessary burden to entities in critical infrastructure sectors,” said CISA Acting Director Nick Andersen. “CISA appreciates our stakeholder’s patience with waiting for our rescheduled town hall meetings to provide their critical input as we finalize this rule. As an agency built on collaboration and coordination, CISA is committed to hearing from the American people, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other community members.”
CIRCIA is a U.S. law that will help the government quickly respond to cyber threats and share information to protect critical infrastructure. Once the final rule is implemented, covered organizations will be required to report certain cyber incidents to CISA within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours.
CISA has received numerous requests for additional engagement on the CIRCIA rulemaking process and greatly values its stakeholders’ interest in shaping a final rule that maximizes CIRCIA’s impact on our Nation’s cybersecurity posture while minimizing unnecessary burden. Given the broad stakeholder community that CIRCIA may potentially impact, CISA will conduct a series of town hall meetings to solicit input on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). CISA selected this approach to gather additional engagement on the CIRCIA NPRM to provide access to CISA across the broad range of entities within the critical infrastructure sectors.
CISA issued the CIRCIA NPRM in April 2024. To inform the CIRCIA NPRM, CISA hosted in-person public listening sessions across the country, conducted virtual sector-specific sessions, and engaged with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) and other federal partners—all aimed at gathering meaningful input from a broad range of stakeholders. The NPRM was open for a 90-day public comment period.

Supply Chain Compromises Impact Nx Console and GitHub Repositories

CISA is prioritizing the response to multiple emerging software supply chain intrusion campaigns targeting developer ecosystems Continuous Integration/Continuous Development (CI/CD) pipelines. These recent incidents, including the GitHub compromise via a malicious Nx Console Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension and the “Megalodon” supply chain intrusion campaign, demonstrate how cyber threat actors are abusing tools and processes that support enterprise, cloud, and DevOps environments—specifically CI/CD pipelines, code extensions and workflows.
Threat actors leveraged a prior compromise of Nx developer systems to compromise a GitHub employee’s device through a poisoned third-party VS Code extension, resulting in unauthorized access and exfiltration of internal GitHub repositories. The malicious extension version (18.95.0) was distributed through VS Code’s automatic update mechanism, meaning systems with Nx Console previously installed may have received the malicious build without developers taking any manual installation action. GitHub released a security advisory on this activity, and CVE-2026-48027 has been assigned to the malicious version of Nx Console and added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.
Additionally, in a campaign known as “Megalodon,” a cyber threat actor injected malicious GitHub Action workflows to harvest CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, and tokens, impacting both development and deployment pipelines in public GitHub repositories.
CISA urges organizations to implement the following recommendations to detect and remediate a potential compromise:
- Monitor and audit workflow files and contributor activity for suspicious pull requests and direct commits, particularly those authored by automated accounts.
- Revert unauthorized changes, especially from automated accounts, e.g., build-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot and especially those made after May 18, 2026.
If your organization discovers a compromise resulting from previously compromised GitHub or Nx Console software, CISA recommends the following steps:
- Conduct a forensics review of CI/CD logs, cloud audit trails, and affected developer machines.
- Rotate/revoke all secrets including: all credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible to CI/CD pipelines, including API keys, cloud provider credentials (Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform, Microsoft Azure), SSH keys, Docker/npm/PyPI/Vault/Terraform/Kubernetes tokens, GitHub/GitLab/Bitbucket tokens, and developer or pipeline secrets.
- Notify proper stakeholders if necessary.
CISA recommends the following best practices for using package repos:
- Wait at least three hours before pulling a new package. This gives the software community time to identify suspicious or malicious packages before they are widely downloaded.
- Pin software to specific trusted versions. Pinning software prevents pulling a malicious or unscreened package during the build process.
- Only pull packages from known and trusted sources. Relying on known and trusted sources reduces the likelihood of downloading a package that has been maliciously forked.
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