Terrorist Watchlist: FBI Should Improve Outreach Efforts to Nonfederal Users

The Threat Screening Center, administered by FBI, is responsible for managing the terrorist watchlist. In recent years, Members of Congress have raised questions about how nonfederal entities use the terrorist watchlist.
GAO was asked to examine the use of the terrorist watchlist by nonfederal law enforcement entities. This report examines (1) nonfederal entities’ reporting of terrorist watchlist encounters to FBI and opportunities for improvement and (2) steps FBI has taken to ensure nonfederal entities’ awareness of watchlist policies through outreach and state-led trainings.
When state and local law enforcement officers encounter people—e.g., in traffic stops—officers check their names against state database systems. The systems will return an alert if a name potentially matches one on the terrorist watchlist, which is managed by the FBI.
In half the interviews with law enforcement agencies, officials said their officers may not always know how to properly respond to these alerts.
We recommended that the FBI develop a communications plan to tell law enforcement agencies about the policies around the terrorist watchlist, and a process to review states' training on the policies.
Nonfederal law enforcement officers query encountered individuals against the terrorist watchlist during routine police interactions, such as traffic stops. After encountering a potentially terrorist watchlisted individual, nonfederal law enforcement officers receive instructions, via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Threat Screening Center to determine whether the individual is a positive or negative match to the terrorist watchlist.
GAO found that almost half of the law enforcement entities GAO interviewed in four states (12 of 26 entities, including police and sheriff’s departments) reported that officers were not consistently reporting encounters with potentially terrorist watchlisted individuals in instances where it is warranted. Seeking information to understand the extent to which nonfederal law enforcement entities are consistently reporting terrorist watchlist encounters could improve the accuracy of watchlist records.
Nonfederal Law Enforcement Steps When Responding To Terrorist Watchlist Encounters
The Threat Screening Center uses outreach efforts to communicate terrorist watchlisting policies to nonfederal law enforcement entities that use the terrorist watchlist. However, GAO found that FBI has not ensured nonfederal law enforcement entities are aware of terrorist watchlist policies and has not taken steps to develop a communication plan for its outreach efforts. Developing a communication plan with goals and measures as well as periodic assessments of progress would help accomplish this. Additionally, FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services does not ensure states train NCIC users on terrorist watchlist policies. Without developing a process to review states’ efforts to do so, FBI cannot ensure that state training programs instruct nonfederal law enforcement to properly protect and respond to terrorist watchlist information.
GAO reviewed watchlist policies and training resources for nonfederal entities and collected encounter data for fiscal years 2019 through 2024. GAO interviewed nonfederal law enforcement officials in four states selected based on the number of encounters and other factors. While not generalizable, these interviews provided insights into officials’ awareness of policies and training.
This is the public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2025. Information on encounter data and official FBI instructions on handling watchlist encounters that FBI deemed sensitive has been omitted.
GAO recommends that FBI (1) seek information to understand the extent to which nonfederal law enforcement entities are consistently reporting terrorist watchlist encounters, (2) develop a communication plan to improve its outreach efforts, and (3) develop a process to review state efforts to instruct NCIC users about watchlist policies. FBI concurred with the recommendations.

CISA Launches New Platform to Strengthen Industry Engagement and Collaboration

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) launched a new Industry Engagement Platform (IEP) designed to facilitate structured, two-way communication between the agency and companies developing innovative and security technologies. The IEP enables CISA to better understand emerging solutions across the technology ecosystem while giving industry a clear, transparent pathway to engage with the agency.
“With the launch of this new platform, we’re opening the door wider to innovation—giving industry a direct line to share the tools and technologies that can help CISA stay ahead of evolving threats,” said CISA Acting Director Madhu Gottumukkala. “The private sector drives innovation and this collaboration is essential to our national resilience.”
The IEP allows organizations – including industry, non-profits, academia, government partners at all and the research community – with a structured process to request conversations with CISA subject matter experts to describe new technologies and capabilities. These engagements give innovators the opportunity to present solutions that may strengthen our nation’s cyber and infrastructure security.
Through customizable technology profiles, the IEP helps connect organizations to the right CISA experts by capturing areas of expertise and specific topics organizations wish to discuss. Participants may also upload capability overviews for CISA to reference in market research and in understanding emerging technologies across sectors.
While participation in the IEP does not provide preferential consideration for future federal contracts, it serves as a key channel for CISA to gain insight into new capabilities and market trends that support mission needs.
CISA encourages organizations with new, emerging, or advanced technology solutions to visit the Industry Engagement Platform. Current areas of interest include:
- Information technology and security controls
- Data, analytics, storage, and data management
- Communications technologies
- Any emerging technologies that advance CISA’s mission, including post-quantum cryptography and other next-generation capabilities
“Strategic collaboration is essential to strengthening national security and resilience,” Gottumukkala added. “The IEP is one of the ways CISA is aligning innovation with mission needs to advance the defense of our nation’s cyber and critical infrastructure.”

2025 CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in collaboration with the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HSSEDI), operated by the MITRE Corporation, has released the 2025 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses. This annual list identifies the most critical weaknesses adversaries exploit to compromise systems, steal data, or disrupt services.
Prioritizing the weaknesses outlined in the Top 25 is integral to CISA’s Secure by Design and Secure by Demand initiatives, which promote building and procuring secure technology solutions. CISA and MITRE encourage organizations to review this list and use it to inform their respective software security strategies.
The 2025 CWE Top 25:
Supports Vulnerability Reduction: By focusing on the Top 25, organizations can prioritize lifecycle changes, adopt safer architectural decisions, and reduce high-impact vulnerabilities related to injection, access control, and memory safety defects.
Drives Cost Efficiencies: Eliminating weaknesses early reduces downstream remediation; addressing them before deployment is more efficient and cost effective than patching, reconfiguring, or responding to emergency incidents.
Strengthens Customer and Stakeholder Trust: Transparent efforts to identify, mitigate, and monitor weaknesses demonstrate commitment to Secure by Design principles. Organizations that prioritize eliminating recurring weaknesses contribute to a safer software ecosystem.
Promotes Consumer Awareness: The Top 25 empowers consumers to understand underlying causes of common vulnerabilities, supports more informed purchasing decisions, and encourages adoption of products that follow robust security engineering practices.
Recommendations for Stakeholders:
For Developers and Product Teams: Review the 2025 CWE Top 25 to identify high-priority weaknesses and adopt Secure by Design practices in development.
For Security Teams: Incorporate the Top 25 into vulnerability management and application security testing to assess and mitigate critical weaknesses.
For Procurement and Risk Managers: Use the Top 25 as a benchmark when evaluating vendors and apply Secure by Demand guidelines to ensure investment in secure products.
By shining a light on the most dangerous software weaknesses, CISA and MITRE reinforce collective efforts to reduce vulnerabilities at the source, strengthen national cybersecurity, and improve long-term resilience.

CISA Update Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG 2.0)

CISA has released an updated Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPG 2.0) with measurable actions for critical infrastructure owners and operators to achieve a foundational level of cybersecurity.
This update incorporates lessons learned, aligns with the most recent National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework revisions, and addresses the most common and impactful threats facing critical infrastructure today.
CPG 2.0 includes a new component focused on the essential role of governance in managing cybersecurity. It emphasizes accountability, risk management, and strategic integration of cybersecurity into day-to-day operations, reinforcing the principle that effective governance is the cornerstone of a resilient cyber posture.
CPGs are streamlined and outcome-driven cybersecurity protections for information technology and operational technology environments and provide:
• Clear, foundational practices aligned with real-world threats.
• Straightforward, outcome-oriented language to aid implementation.
• A baseline for guiding investment, benchmarking progress, and reducing risk in measurable ways.
For more information, visit CPG 2.0 and Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals | CISA

PRC State-Sponsored Actors Use BRICKSTORM Malware Across Public Sector and Information Technology Systems

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is aware of ongoing intrusions by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors using BRICKSTORM malware for long-term persistence on victim systems. BRICKSTORM is a sophisticated backdoor for VMware vSphere1,2 and Windows environments.3 Victim organizations are primarily in the Government Services and Facilities and Information Technology Sectors. BRICKSTORM enables cyber threat actors to maintain stealthy access and provides capabilities for initiation, persistence, and secure command and control. The malware employs advanced functionality, including multiple layers of encryption (e.g., HTTPS, WebSockets, and nested TLS), DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to conceal communications, and a SOCKS proxy to facilitate lateral movement and tunneling within victim networks. BRICKSTORM also incorporates long-term persistence mechanisms, such as a self-monitoring function that automatically reinstalls or restarts the malware if disrupted, ensuring its continued operation.
The initial access vector varies. In one confirmed compromise, PRC state-sponsored cyber actors accessed a web server inside the organization’s demilitarized zone (DMZ), moved laterally to an internal VMware vCenter server, then implanted BRICKSTORM malware. See CISA, the National Security Agency, and Canadian Cyber Security Centre’s (Cyber Centre’s) joint Malware Analysis Report (MAR) BRICKSTORM Backdoor for analysis of the BRICKSTORM sample CISA obtained during an incident response engagement for this victim. The MAR also discusses seven additional BRICKSTORM samples, which exhibit variations in functionality and capabilities, further highlighting the complexity and adaptability of this malware.
After obtaining access to victim systems, PRC state-sponsored cyber actors obtain and use legitimate credentials by performing system backups or capturing Active Directory database information to exfiltrate sensitive information. Cyber actors then target VMware vSphere platforms to steal cloned virtual machine (VM) snapshots for credential extraction and create hidden rogue VMs to evade detection.
CISA recommends that network defenders hunt for existing intrusions and mitigate further compromise by taking the following actions:
• Scan for BRICKSTORM using CISA-created YARA and Sigma rules; see joint MAR BRICKSTORM Backdoor.
• Block unauthorized DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) providers and external DoH network traffic to reduce unmonitored communications.
• Take inventory of all network edge devices and monitor for any suspicious network connectivity originating from these devices.
• Ensure proper network segmentation that restricts network traffic from the DMZ to the internal network.
See joint MAR BRICKSTORM Backdoor for additional detection resources.

CISA, Australia, and Partners Author Joint Guidance on Securely Integrating Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology

CISA and the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre, in collaboration with federal and international partners, have released new cybersecurity guidance: Principles for the Secure Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology.
This guidance aims to help critical infrastructure owners and operators integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into operational technology (OT) systems securely, balancing the benefits of AI—such as increased efficiency, enhanced decision-making, and cost savings—with the unique risks it poses to the safety, security, and reliability of OT environments.
The document focuses on machine learning (ML), large language models (LLMs), and AI agents due to their complex security challenges, but is also applicable to systems using traditional statistical modeling and logic-based automation.
Key Principles for Secure AI Integration:
1. Understand AI: Educate personnel on AI risks, impacts, and secure development lifecycles.
2. Assess AI Use in OT: Evaluate business cases, manage OT data security risks, and address immediate and long-term integration challenges.
3. Establish AI Governance: Implement governance frameworks, test AI models continuously, and ensure regulatory compliance.
4. Embed Safety and Security: Maintain oversight, ensure transparency, and integrate AI into incident response plans.
Critical infrastructure owners and operators are encouraged to adopt these principles to maximize AI benefits while mitigating risks. For further details, review the full guidance.

CISA Releases Advisory on Lessons Learned from an Incident Response Engagement

CISA released a cybersecurity advisory detailing lessons learned from an incident response engagement following the detection of potential malicious activity identified through security alerts generated by the agency’s endpoint detection and response tool.
This advisory, CISA Shares Lessons Learned from an Incident Response Engagement, highlights takeaways that illuminate the urgent need for timely patching, comprehensive incident response planning, and proactive threat monitoring to mitigate risks from similar vulnerabilities.
The advisory also outlines the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by cyber threat actors, including exploitation of GeoServer Vulnerability CVE-2024-36401 for initial access. By understanding these TTPs, organizations can enhance their defenses against similar threats.
CISA recommends organizations take the following actions:
- Prioritize Patch Management: Expedite patching of critical vulnerabilities, particularly those listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with a focus on public-facing systems.
- Strengthen Incident Response Plans: Regularly update, test, and maintain incident response plans, ensuring they include procedures for engaging third-party responders and deploying security tools without delay.
- Enhance Threat Monitoring: Implement centralized, out-of-band logging and ensure security operations centers continuously monitor and investigate abnormal network activity to detect and respond to malicious activity effectively.
CISA urges organizations to apply these lessons learned to bolster their security posture, improve preparedness, and reduce the risk of future compromises. For additional details, review the full cybersecurity advisory.

Commission Communication to strengthen the resilience of critical entities across the EU adopted

On 11 September 2025, a Commission Communication to strengthen the resilience of critical entities across the EU was adopted. It provides non-binding guidance to EU countries to identify their critical entities and a risk assessment reporting template.

Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities1 (‘the Directive’) aims to ensure that services essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities are provided in an unobstructed manner in the internal market. The Directive enhances the resilience of the critical entities providing such services and creates an overarching framework of resilience of critical entities in respect of all hazards (natural and man-made, accidental or intentional).
To achieve a high level of resilience, Member States have obligations under the Directive. The Commission was mandated to develop recommendations, non-binding guidelines and a voluntary common reporting template to support them in fulfilling some of these obligations. Specifically, this Communication gives effect to Article 5(5) of the Directive regarding the development of a template for the provision of certain information to the Commission, to Article 6(6) of the Directive regarding the development of recommendations and guidelines to support Member States in identifying critical entities, and to Article 7(3) of the Directive regarding the adoption of guidelines to facilitate the application of the criteria for determining the significance of a disruptive effect, taking into account the information that Member States must submit in accordance with Article 7(2) of the Directive.
Before the adoption of this Communication, in accordance with the aforementioned provisions, Member States were consulted in a workshop that took place on 3-4 October 2024 and the Critical Entities Resilience Group (CERG) was consulted on 12 February 2025. Further bilateral consultations of CERG delegates took place in writing in March 2025 and an updated version was shared with the CERG on 7 April 2025.
The present Communication is not legally binding and does not affect the interpretation of EU law by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The voluntary common reporting template for Member States to provide certain information related to the risk assessment to the Commission, as provided for in Article 5(5) of the Directive, is set out in the Annex.
Although this reporting template is voluntary in nature, Member States are encouraged to use it when providing information pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Directive.
Further details can be found in the 'Commission Guidelines and reporting template developed pursuant to Articles 5(5), 6(6) and 7(3) of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities'.

Standards Australia adopts world’s foremost standard for operational technology

Australia has officially adopted the AS IEC 62443 series as national standards for protecting Operational Technology (OT) in critical infrastructure from cyber threats. This decision comes as cyberattacks grow more frequent and sophisticated, increasingly targeting the systems that support our daily lives.
OT systems are the backbone of essential services such as energy, water, transport, medical devices, and building automation. A successful cyberattack on these systems could disrupt communities, threaten public safety, and harm the environment. The AS IEC 62443 standards help prevent this by offering a clear, structured approach to cybersecurity that supports safety, reliability, and resilience throughout the life of these systems.
A Practical Framework for Securing OT Systems
OT environments face unique cybersecurity challenges that differ from traditional IT systems. To address these, specialised standards were developed for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). In response, the IEC/Technical Committee 65 Industrial-process measurement, control and automation developed the IEC 62443 series – Security for industrial automation and control systems. These standards are now recognised in Australia as AS IEC 62443, with the support and contributions from our national committee IT-006.
These standards are modular and role-based, allowing users to select only the parts relevant to their responsibilities or the stage of the system lifecycle they’re working in. They are designed for asset owners, service providers, and product suppliers, and they align with local regulatory requirements—making implementation practical and effective across sectors.
The benefits of adopting AS IEC 62443 are wide-reaching:
- Protects public health by helping to reduce the risk of system failures caused by cyberattacks
- Supports social stability by safeguarding the essential services communities rely on
- Boosts economic opportunities by allowing consumers to safely participate in energy markets, such as selling power back to the grid
- Reduces reputational risk by minimising the chance of prolonged outages and public fallout for organisations managing critical infrastructure
The IEC continues to evolve these standards to meet the needs of emerging technologies and smart systems. A new addition – Part 1-6 – will address the application of the series to the Industrial Internet of Things, further supporting the safety, reliability, and performance of smart energy, smart manufacturing, and smart cities.
By adopting AS IEC 62443, Australia is taking a proactive step to ensure its critical infrastructure is secure, resilient, and ready for the future.

Thorium Platform Public Availability

CISA, in partnership with Sandia National Laboratories, announced the public availability of Thorium, a scalable and distributed platform for automated file analysis and result aggregation. Thorium enhances cybersecurity teams' capabilities by automating analysis workflows through seamless integration of commercial, open-source, and custom tools. It supports various mission functions, including software analysis, digital forensics, and incident response, allowing analysts to efficiently assess complex malware threats.
Thorium enables teams that frequently analyze files to achieve scalable automation and results indexing within a unified platform. Analysts can integrate command-line tools as Docker images, filter results using tags and full-text search, and manage access with strict group-based permissions.
Designed to scale with hardware using Kubernetes and ScyllaDB, Thorium can ingest over 10 million files per hour per permission group while maintaining rapid query performance. It also allows users to define event triggers and tool execution sequences, control the platform via RESTful API, and aggregate outputs for further analysis or integration with downstream processes.
CISA encourages cybersecurity teams to use Thorium and provide feedback to enhance its capabilities. For more information on Thorium and how it can improve your cybersecurity operations, see CISA’s Thorium resource webpage.
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