UK arrest following aerospace cyber incident

A man has been arrested in the UK by the National Crime Agency as part of an investigation into a cyber incident impacting Collins Aerospace.
The incident, which was reported on 19 September, affected flights at Heathrow and other European airports over the weekend.
NCA officers, supported by the South East ROCU, arrested a man in his forties in West Sussex yesterday evening on suspicion of Computer Misuse Act offences. He has been released on conditional bail.
Deputy Director Paul Foster, head of the NCA’s National Cyber Crime Unit, said:
“Although this arrest is a positive step, the investigation into this incident is in its early stages and remains ongoing.”
“Cybercrime is a persistent global threat that continues to cause significant disruption to the UK. Alongside our partners here and overseas, the NCA is committed to reducing that threat in order to protect the British public.”

Unidentified Drone Incursions Temporarily Shut Down Copenhagen and Oslo Airports

Authorities in Denmark and Norway are investigating a series of unauthorized drone sightings that forced the temporary closure of airspace over two major international airports—Copenhagen's Kastrup Airport and Oslo's Gardermoen Airport, and are being treated as serious threats to national and regional security.
In Copenhagen, multiple drones were detected near the airport perimeter, leading to a near four-hour shutdown that disrupted over 50 flights and affected approximately 20,000 passengers. Danish police say the drones demonstrated flight behavior consistent with advanced operation, and officials have described the incursion as one of the most significant threats to Denmark’s critical infrastructure in recent memory.
Shortly after the Copenhagen incident, Oslo’s main airport reported similar drone activity, prompting Norwegian authorities to temporarily close airspace. Though the disruption lasted just under three hours, it led to delays and diversions and raised concerns about a coordinated effort.
While Danish and Norwegian officials are cooperating closely, no definitive link between the two incidents has been established. Authorities in both countries are analyzing radar data, visual reports, and drone signatures as part of a joint investigation. Danish leadership has confirmed the threat level to critical infrastructure remains elevated.
Security experts across Europe have expressed growing alarm over the vulnerability of critical national infrastructure and entities to drone-related threats. Discussions are now underway among Nordic and EU partners regarding the implementation of a regional drone defense strategy.

CISA Releases Advisory on Lessons Learned from an Incident Response Engagement

CISA released a cybersecurity advisory detailing lessons learned from an incident response engagement following the detection of potential malicious activity identified through security alerts generated by the agency’s endpoint detection and response tool.
This advisory, CISA Shares Lessons Learned from an Incident Response Engagement, highlights takeaways that illuminate the urgent need for timely patching, comprehensive incident response planning, and proactive threat monitoring to mitigate risks from similar vulnerabilities.
The advisory also outlines the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed by cyber threat actors, including exploitation of GeoServer Vulnerability CVE-2024-36401 for initial access. By understanding these TTPs, organizations can enhance their defenses against similar threats.
CISA recommends organizations take the following actions:
- Prioritize Patch Management: Expedite patching of critical vulnerabilities, particularly those listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, with a focus on public-facing systems.
- Strengthen Incident Response Plans: Regularly update, test, and maintain incident response plans, ensuring they include procedures for engaging third-party responders and deploying security tools without delay.
- Enhance Threat Monitoring: Implement centralized, out-of-band logging and ensure security operations centers continuously monitor and investigate abnormal network activity to detect and respond to malicious activity effectively.
CISA urges organizations to apply these lessons learned to bolster their security posture, improve preparedness, and reduce the risk of future compromises. For additional details, review the full cybersecurity advisory.

Commission Communication to strengthen the resilience of critical entities across the EU adopted

On 11 September 2025, a Commission Communication to strengthen the resilience of critical entities across the EU was adopted. It provides non-binding guidance to EU countries to identify their critical entities and a risk assessment reporting template.

Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities1 (‘the Directive’) aims to ensure that services essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions or economic activities are provided in an unobstructed manner in the internal market. The Directive enhances the resilience of the critical entities providing such services and creates an overarching framework of resilience of critical entities in respect of all hazards (natural and man-made, accidental or intentional).
To achieve a high level of resilience, Member States have obligations under the Directive. The Commission was mandated to develop recommendations, non-binding guidelines and a voluntary common reporting template to support them in fulfilling some of these obligations. Specifically, this Communication gives effect to Article 5(5) of the Directive regarding the development of a template for the provision of certain information to the Commission, to Article 6(6) of the Directive regarding the development of recommendations and guidelines to support Member States in identifying critical entities, and to Article 7(3) of the Directive regarding the adoption of guidelines to facilitate the application of the criteria for determining the significance of a disruptive effect, taking into account the information that Member States must submit in accordance with Article 7(2) of the Directive.
Before the adoption of this Communication, in accordance with the aforementioned provisions, Member States were consulted in a workshop that took place on 3-4 October 2024 and the Critical Entities Resilience Group (CERG) was consulted on 12 February 2025. Further bilateral consultations of CERG delegates took place in writing in March 2025 and an updated version was shared with the CERG on 7 April 2025.
The present Communication is not legally binding and does not affect the interpretation of EU law by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The voluntary common reporting template for Member States to provide certain information related to the risk assessment to the Commission, as provided for in Article 5(5) of the Directive, is set out in the Annex.
Although this reporting template is voluntary in nature, Member States are encouraged to use it when providing information pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Directive.
Further details can be found in the 'Commission Guidelines and reporting template developed pursuant to Articles 5(5), 6(6) and 7(3) of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities'.

The latest issue of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News has arrived

Download your copy now at www.cip-association.org/CIPRNews
Please find here your downloadable copy of the Summer 2025 issue of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News, the official magazine of the International Association of CIP Professionals (IACIPP), for the latest views, features and news, including a Preview of the forthcoming Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience Europe conference, taking place in Brindisi, Italy next month as part of CIP Week in Europe, and co-hosted with The International Emergency Management Society (TIEMS) conference.
Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News in this issue:
- Building Ukraine’s Shield: The Bold New Effort to Train Critical Infrastructure Security Professionals
- Critical Infrastructure Security Doesn’t Have Time for False Alarms as the Airspace Gets Busier with Drones
- The Drones Revolution and Its Implications for Modern Ground Warfare with Special Focus on Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience
- E-GIANTS Project Concludes Study on GNSS Authentication and Security Improvements
- Digital twins: The new pillar of critical infrastructure security
- Legal and Regulatory aspects relating to the physical security of the telecommunications infrastructure used for critical communication services
- Celebrating 10 years of IACIPP
- Preview of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience Europe
- Securing the Backbone of Society: How to Protect Critical Network Infrastructure
- Closing the Gaps in Insider Threat Mitigation
- Zero Trust IEEE Standard: In Progress
- Expert interview with the European Utilities Telecom Council (EUTC)
- Agency News
- Industry News
Download your copy at www.cip-association.org/CIPRNews
#criticalinfrastructureprotection #criticalinfrastructure #resilience #cybersecurity #emergencymanagement #riskmitigation #portsecurity #homelandsecurity #firstresponder #riskmanagement #ai #artificalintelligence #energysecurity #gridresilience

Standards Australia adopts world’s foremost standard for operational technology

Australia has officially adopted the AS IEC 62443 series as national standards for protecting Operational Technology (OT) in critical infrastructure from cyber threats. This decision comes as cyberattacks grow more frequent and sophisticated, increasingly targeting the systems that support our daily lives.
OT systems are the backbone of essential services such as energy, water, transport, medical devices, and building automation. A successful cyberattack on these systems could disrupt communities, threaten public safety, and harm the environment. The AS IEC 62443 standards help prevent this by offering a clear, structured approach to cybersecurity that supports safety, reliability, and resilience throughout the life of these systems.
A Practical Framework for Securing OT Systems
OT environments face unique cybersecurity challenges that differ from traditional IT systems. To address these, specialised standards were developed for Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). In response, the IEC/Technical Committee 65 Industrial-process measurement, control and automation developed the IEC 62443 series – Security for industrial automation and control systems. These standards are now recognised in Australia as AS IEC 62443, with the support and contributions from our national committee IT-006.
These standards are modular and role-based, allowing users to select only the parts relevant to their responsibilities or the stage of the system lifecycle they’re working in. They are designed for asset owners, service providers, and product suppliers, and they align with local regulatory requirements—making implementation practical and effective across sectors.
The benefits of adopting AS IEC 62443 are wide-reaching:
- Protects public health by helping to reduce the risk of system failures caused by cyberattacks
- Supports social stability by safeguarding the essential services communities rely on
- Boosts economic opportunities by allowing consumers to safely participate in energy markets, such as selling power back to the grid
- Reduces reputational risk by minimising the chance of prolonged outages and public fallout for organisations managing critical infrastructure
The IEC continues to evolve these standards to meet the needs of emerging technologies and smart systems. A new addition – Part 1-6 – will address the application of the series to the Industrial Internet of Things, further supporting the safety, reliability, and performance of smart energy, smart manufacturing, and smart cities.
By adopting AS IEC 62443, Australia is taking a proactive step to ensure its critical infrastructure is secure, resilient, and ready for the future.

Thorium Platform Public Availability

CISA, in partnership with Sandia National Laboratories, announced the public availability of Thorium, a scalable and distributed platform for automated file analysis and result aggregation. Thorium enhances cybersecurity teams' capabilities by automating analysis workflows through seamless integration of commercial, open-source, and custom tools. It supports various mission functions, including software analysis, digital forensics, and incident response, allowing analysts to efficiently assess complex malware threats.
Thorium enables teams that frequently analyze files to achieve scalable automation and results indexing within a unified platform. Analysts can integrate command-line tools as Docker images, filter results using tags and full-text search, and manage access with strict group-based permissions.
Designed to scale with hardware using Kubernetes and ScyllaDB, Thorium can ingest over 10 million files per hour per permission group while maintaining rapid query performance. It also allows users to define event triggers and tool execution sequences, control the platform via RESTful API, and aggregate outputs for further analysis or integration with downstream processes.
CISA encourages cybersecurity teams to use Thorium and provide feedback to enhance its capabilities. For more information on Thorium and how it can improve your cybersecurity operations, see CISA’s Thorium resource webpage.

CISA and USCG Issue Joint Advisory to Strengthen Cyber Hygiene in Critical Infrastructure

CISA, in partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory aimed at helping critical infrastructure organizations improve their cyber hygiene. This follows a proactive threat hunt engagement conducted at a U.S. critical infrastructure facility.
During this engagement, CISA and USCG did not find evidence of malicious cyber activity or actor presence on the organization’s network but did identify several cybersecurity risks. CISA and USCG are sharing their findings and associated mitigations to assist other critical infrastructure organizations identify potential similar issues and take proactive measures to improve their cybersecurity posture. The mitigations include best practices such as not storing passwords or credentials in plaintext, avoiding sharing local administrator account credentials, and implementing comprehensive logging.
In coordination with the organization where the hunt was conducted, CISA and USCG are sharing cybersecurity risk findings and associated mitigations to assist other critical infrastructure organizations with improving their cybersecurity posture. Recommendations are listed for each of CISA’s findings, as well as general practices to strengthen cybersecurity for OT environments. These mitigations align with CISA and the National Institute for Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs), and with mitigations provided in the USCG Cyber Command’s (CGCYBER) 2024 Cyber Trends and Insights in the Marine Environment (CTIME) Report.
Although no malicious activity was identified during this engagement, critical infrastructure organizations are advised to review and implement the mitigations listed in this advisory to prevent potential compromises and better protect our national infrastructure. These mitigations include the following (listed in order of importance):
- Do not store passwords or credentials in plaintext. Instead, use secure password and credential management solutions such as encrypted password vaults, managed service accounts, or built-in secure features of deployment tools.
- Ensure that all credentials are encrypted both at rest and in transit. Implement strict access controls and regular audits to securely manage scripts or tools accessing credentials.
- Use code reviews and automated scanning tools to detect and eliminate any instances of plaintext credentials on hosts or workstations.
- Enforce the principle of least privilege, only granting users and processes the access necessary to perform their functions.
- Avoid sharing local administrator account credentials. Instead, provision unique, complex passwords for each account using tools like Microsoft’s Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) that automate password management and rotation.
- Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) for all administrative access, including local and domain accounts, and for remote access methods such as Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and virtual private network (VPN) connections.
- Implement and enforce strict policies to only use hardened bastion hosts isolated from IT networks equipped with phishing-resistant MFA to access industrial control systems (ICS)/OT networks, and ensure regular workstations (i.e., workstations used for accessing IT networks and applications) cannot be used to access ICS/OT networks.
- Implement comprehensive (i.e., large coverage) and detailed logging across all systems, including workstations, servers, network devices, and security appliances.
- Ensure logs capture information such as authentication attempts, command-line executions with arguments, and network connections.
- Retain logs for an appropriate period to enable thorough historical analysis (adhering to organizational policies and compliance requirements) and aggregate logs in an out-of-band, centralized location, such as a security information event management (SIEM) tool, to protect them from tampering and facilitate efficient analysis.

CISA and Partners Release Updated Advisory on Scattered Spider Group

CISA, along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s Australian Signals Directorate, and the Australian Federal Police and National Cyber Security Centre, released an updated joint Cybersecurity Advisory on Scattered Spider—a cybercriminal group targeting commercial facilities sectors and subsectors. This advisory provides updated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) obtained through FBI investigations conducted through June 2025.
Scattered Spider threat actors have been known to use various ransomware variants in data extortion attacks, most recently including DragonForce ransomware. While Scattered Spider often changes TTPs to remain undetected, some TTPs remain consistent. These actors frequently use social engineering techniques such as phishing, push bombing, and subscriber identity module swap attacks to obtain credentials, install remote access tools, and bypass multi-factor authentication.
The Mitigations section of the Scattered Spider joint Cybersecurity Advisory offers critical infrastructure organizations and commercial facilities recommendations to fortify their defenses.

DIREKTION network and CMINE Responder Technologies Cluster release joint policy brief and survey

The DIREKTION network has released a joint policy brief together with the CMINE Responder Technologies Cluster under the title “Strengthening Responder Technology in Disasters”. The brief includes concrete recommendations to support the operational uptake of innovation and to strengthen coordination mechanisms across Europe.
The document provides a set of recommendations to better align research and innovation programming with the real needs of disaster responders, improve the conditions for technology uptake, and foster coordination among actors and countries.
The brief is aimed at three key stakeholder groups:
- First responders and civil protection actors, who need practical, user-friendly, and trustworthy technologies;
- Technology developers and research consortia, who must design solutions that are fit for operational environments;
- Public authorities and policymakers, who shape the research agendas, funding frameworks, and standards that govern innovation uptake.
Structured around five strategic areas, the policy brief recommends:
- Aligning research priorities with operational needs
- Promoting ethical and inclusive technology design
- Leveraging innovation procurement (e.g. Pre-Commercial Procurement, Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions)
- Enhancing interoperability and cross-border standardisation
- Supporting responder training, guidance, and preparedness
These insights were generated through work carried out by the Responder Technology Cluster, consisting of more than 20 projects hosted on the CMINE platform and supported by the DIREKTION consortium.
Organisations and individuals are invited to read, share, and endorse the brief.
1 … 5 6 7 8 9 … 64