CISA Launches Campaign to Reduce Risk of Ransomeware

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) announced the Reduce the Risk of Ransomware Campaign today, a focused, coordinated and sustained effort to encourage public and private sector organizations to implement best practices, tools and resources that can help them mitigate this cybersecurity risk and threat.
Ransomware is increasingly threatening both public and private networks, causing data loss, privacy concerns, and costing billions of dollars a year. These incidents can severely impact business processes and leave organizations without the data they need to operate and deliver mission-critical services. Malicious actors have adjusted their ransomware tactics over time to include pressuring victims for payment by threatening to release stolen data if they refuse to pay and publicly naming and shaming victims as secondary forms of extortion.
“CISA is committed to working with organization at all levels to protect their networks from the threat of ransomware,” said Brandon Wales, Director (Acting) of CISA. “This includes working collaboratively with our public and private sector partners to understand, develop and share timely information about the varied and disruptive ransomware threats. Anyone can be the victim of ransomware, and so everyone should take steps to protect their systems.”
In this campaign, which will have a particular focus on supporting COVID-19 response organizations and K-12 educational institutions, CISA is working to raise awareness about the importance of combating ransomware as part of an organization’s cybersecurity and data protection best practices. Over the next several months, CISA will use its social media platforms to iterate key behaviors or actions with resource links that can help technical and non-technical partners combat ransomware attacks.
CISA established a new one-stop resource at cisa.gov/ransomware. On this page, interested partners will find four categories of ransomware resources:
- Alerts and Statements: Official CISA updates to help stakeholders guard against the ever-evolving ransomware threat environment. These alerts are geared toward system administrators and other technical staff to bolster their organization’s security posture.
- Guides and Services: Tips and best practices for home users, organizations, and technical staff to guard against the growing ransomware threat.
- Fact Sheets and Infographics: Easy-to-use, straightforward information to help organizations and individuals better understand the threats from and the consequences of a ransomware attack.
- Trainings and Webinars: This information provides technical and non-technical audiences, including managers, business leaders, and technical specialists with an organizational perspective and strategic overview.
Many of the resources on this webpage were developed in collaboration with industry and interagency partners, such as:
- CISA and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide;
- CISA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Joint Cybersecurity Advisory on Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector;
- CISA, FBI, DHS Homeland Security Investigations, and U.S. Secret Service recorded video discussion on Trends and Predictions in Ransomware from the 2020 CISA National Cybersecurity Summit.
- CISA Fact Sheet on Cyber Threats to K-12 Remote Learning Education for non-technical educational professionals with contributions from the FBI.

CISA Updates Emergency Directive 21-01 Supplemental Guidance and Activity Alert on SolarWinds Orion Compromise

CISA has released Emergency Directive (ED) 21-01 Supplemental Guidance version 3: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise, providing guidance that supersedes Required Action 4 of ED 21-01 and Supplemental Guidance versions 1 and 2.
- Federal agencies without evidence of adversary follow-on activity on their networks that accept the risk of running SolarWinds Orion in their enterprises should rebuild or upgrade, in compliance with hardening steps outlined in the Supplemental Guidance, to at least SolarWinds Orion Platform version 2020.2.1 HF2. The National Security Agency (NSA) examined this version and verified it eliminates the previously identified malicious code. This version also includes updates to fix un-related vulnerabilities, including vulnerabilities that SolarWinds has publicly disclosed.
- Federal agencies with evidence of follow-on threat actor activity on their networks should keep their affected versions disconnected, conduct forensic analysis, and consult with CISA before rebuilding or reimaging affected platforms and host operating systems.
The updated supplemental guidance also includes forensic analysis and reporting requirements.
CISA has also updated AA20-352A: Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations, originally released December 17, 2020. This update includes new information on initial access vectors, updated mitigation recommendations, and new indicators of compromise (IOCs).
Although the Emergency Directive only applies to Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies, CISA encourages state and local governments, critical infrastructure entities, and other private sector organizations to review CISA Emergency Directive 21-01 - Supplemental Guidance v.3 for recommendations on operating the SolarWinds Orion Platform. Review the following resources for additional information on the SolarWinds Orion compromise.

CISA Releases ICT Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force Year 2 Report

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and government and industry members of the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Task Force released an annual report on its progress to advance meaningful partnerships and analysis around supply chain security and resilience.
The ICT SCRM Task Force Year 2 Report builds upon previous work completed in year one of the ICT SCRM Task Force. It showcases the collective ongoing efforts of four working within the Task Force to address challenges to information sharing, threat analysis, qualified bidder and qualified manufacturer lists, and vendor assurance. It also reflects a new working group, Working Group 5, which recently released an analysis report on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on ICT supply chains.
Developed through the expertise and contributions of government and industry, the ICT SCRM Task Force Year 2 Report addresses the lifecycle of supply chain risk management, including how stakeholders identify and understand risk, communicate about and work together to address risk, grow their structural operations for addressing risks, and improve their understanding and self-assessment of their risk posture.
“Government can’t act in a silo,” said Bob Kolasky, CISA Assistant Director and ICT SCRM Task Force Co-Chair. “We must work in partnership with public and private industry. The Task Force has and will continue to serve as a model of excellence in helping to improve the Nation’s collective ability to assess and mitigate threats to the ICT supply chain.”
“As we were reminded this week, supply chain security is a matter of urgency and consequence, and the best way to increase our defenses is through substantial coordination and cooperation between government and industry,” said Robert Mayer, Senior Vice President of Cybersecurity and Innovation at USTelecom and ICT SCRM Task Force Co-Chair. “That is the mission of our task force. Through this partnership with DHS and more than a dozen agencies, the Information Technology and Communications sectors has tackled tough issues like information sharing, threat assessment, qualified bidders and manufacturer lists, and security issues presented by the pandemic. This is a partnership that will expand in 2021 and further strengthen the security and resiliency of our supply chain.”
“For the past two years, the Information Technology and Communications sectors have worked hand-in-glove with CISA and other federal government partners to establish the Task Force as the preeminent public-private partnership tackling the critical issue of global ICT supply chain security,” said John Miller, Senior Vice President of Policy and Senior Counsel at Information Technology Industry Council (ITI) and ICT SCRM Task Force Co-Chair. “The Year 2 Report represents a significant milestone, delivering actionable recommendations to help public and private sector organizations better assess and manage supply chain risks, including by creating tools to address supply chain threat information sharing, threat analysis, and vendor assurance and trust. The Task Force looks forward to working with our federal partners in 2021 and beyond to operationalize the policy recommendations in this report to better manage today’s all-too-real supply chain threats and to develop future work products that will address other dimensions of this important national security issue.”
The Task Force plans to release working group reports described in the Year 2 Report in the coming weeks. Members will continue to explore means for building partnerships with international partners, new sectors, and stakeholders who can help grow the applicability and utilization of Task Force products.

CISA Issue Emergency Directive to Mitigate Compromise of Solarwinds Orion Network Management Products

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued Emergency Directive 21-01, in response to a known compromise involving SolarWinds Orion products that are currently being exploited by malicious actors. This Emergency Directive calls on all federal civilian agencies to review their networks for indicators of compromise and disconnect or power down SolarWinds Orion products immediately.
“The compromise of SolarWinds’ Orion Network Management Products poses unacceptable risks to the security of federal networks,” said CISA Acting Director Brandon Wales. “This directive is intended to mitigate potential compromises within federal civilian networks, and we urge all our partners—in the public and private sectors—to assess their exposure to this compromise and to secure their networks against any exploitation.”
This is the fifth Emergency Directive issued by CISA under the authorities granted by Congress in the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. All agencies operating SolarWinds products should provide a completion report to CISA.

CISA Highlights Theft of FireEye Red Team Tools

The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has advised FireEye has released a blog addressing unauthorized access to their Red Team’s tools by a highly sophisticated threat actor. Red Team tools are often used by cybersecurity organizations to evaluate the security posture of enterprise systems. Although the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has not received reporting of these tools being maliciously used to date, unauthorized third-party users could abuse these tools to take control of targeted systems. The exposed tools do not contain zero-day exploits.

CISA recommends cybersecurity practitioners review FireEye’s two blog posts for more information and FireEye’s GitHub repository for detection countermeasures:

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