Supply Chain Compromises Impact Nx Console and GitHub Repositories

CISA is prioritizing the response to multiple emerging software supply chain intrusion campaigns targeting developer ecosystems Continuous Integration/Continuous Development (CI/CD) pipelines. These recent incidents, including the GitHub compromise via a malicious Nx Console Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension and the “Megalodon” supply chain intrusion campaign, demonstrate how cyber threat actors are abusing tools and processes that support enterprise, cloud, and DevOps environments—specifically CI/CD pipelines, code extensions and workflows.
Threat actors leveraged a prior compromise of Nx developer systems to compromise a GitHub employee’s device through a poisoned third-party VS Code extension, resulting in unauthorized access and exfiltration of internal GitHub repositories. The malicious extension version (18.95.0) was distributed through VS Code’s automatic update mechanism, meaning systems with Nx Console previously installed may have received the malicious build without developers taking any manual installation action. GitHub released a security advisory on this activity, and CVE-2026-48027 has been assigned to the malicious version of Nx Console and added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog.
Additionally, in a campaign known as “Megalodon,” a cyber threat actor injected malicious GitHub Action workflows to harvest CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, and tokens, impacting both development and deployment pipelines in public GitHub repositories.
CISA urges organizations to implement the following recommendations to detect and remediate a potential compromise:
- Monitor and audit workflow files and contributor activity for suspicious pull requests and direct commits, particularly those authored by automated accounts.
- Revert unauthorized changes, especially from automated accounts, e.g., build-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot and especially those made after May 18, 2026.
If your organization discovers a compromise resulting from previously compromised GitHub or Nx Console software, CISA recommends the following steps:
- Conduct a forensics review of CI/CD logs, cloud audit trails, and affected developer machines.
- Rotate/revoke all secrets including: all credentials, tokens, and secrets accessible to CI/CD pipelines, including API keys, cloud provider credentials (Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform, Microsoft Azure), SSH keys, Docker/npm/PyPI/Vault/Terraform/Kubernetes tokens, GitHub/GitLab/Bitbucket tokens, and developer or pipeline secrets.
- Notify proper stakeholders if necessary.
CISA recommends the following best practices for using package repos:
- Wait at least three hours before pulling a new package. This gives the software community time to identify suspicious or malicious packages before they are widely downloaded.
- Pin software to specific trusted versions. Pinning software prevents pulling a malicious or unscreened package during the build process.
- Only pull packages from known and trusted sources. Relying on known and trusted sources reduces the likelihood of downloading a package that has been maliciously forked.

CISA, NCSC-UK and Partners Release Cybersecurity Advisory on Chinese Government-Linked Covert Networks

CISA and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre, in collaboration with other federal and international partners, have released a cybersecurity advisory, Defending Against China-nexus Covert Networks of Compromised Devices, providing network defenders with vital tools and resources to combat the threat posed by Chinese government-linked threat actors’ use of covert networks of compromised devices.
The advisory outlines tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with Chinese government-linked covert networks built from compromised small-office-home-office routers, Internet of Things, and smart devices. It explains how threat actors leveraging these covert networks, including those previously tied to groups such as Volt Typhoon and Flax Typhoon, use large scale botnet infrastructure to obscure attribution and enable reconnaissance, intrusion, command-and-control, and data exfiltration.
The advisory provides tailored defensive guidance for cyber defenders to identify, baseline, and mitigate activity originating from dynamic, deniable covert networks to reduce the risk of organizational compromise.
CISA and partners recommend the following steps to protect against this threat:
• Map and understand network edge devices, developing a clear understanding of organizational assets and what should be connected to them.
• Baseline normal connections, especially to corporate VPNs or other similar devices.
• Maintain log collection and storage solutions to assist with detecting and responding to unauthorized access attempts.
• Implement multifactor authentication for remote connections.
For more information on Chinese government-linked threat actor activity, please visit CISA's China Threat Overview and Advisories page.

OSCE promotes marine transport security and relevant Convention implementation

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana co-organized a practical seminar on inspection of higher educational institutions and maritime training centres of Kazakhstan in co-operation with the Committee of Railway and Water Transport of the Ministry of Transport and with the support of the Kazakhstan Maritime Academy of the Kazakh-British Technical University. The main goal of the seminar was to strengthen oversight of inspection and accreditation of higher educational institutions and maritime training centres in Kazakhstan, in line with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
Maritime safety begins long before a vessel leaves port, it starts in the classroom, where future seafarers are trained to meet international standards. The STCW sets globally accepted minimum standards for the training, certification, and competence of seafarers, ensuring that ships are operated safely worldwide. Before STCW, standards varied widely between countries, creating risks to maritime safety and uneven levels of crew competence. The Convention also plays a key role in protecting the marine environment, as competent seafarers are better equipped to prevent pollution and respond effectively to environmental emergencies.
The seminar focused on the strict STCW requirements governing seafarer training, including curriculum development, teaching methodologies, assessment processes, and institutional facilities. Participants gained a comprehensive understanding of how inspections are conducted, the methodologies used for evaluation, and the specific criteria applied during accreditation.
Through in-depth discussions and practical guidance delivered by an international expert, the seminar helped to identify areas for improvement and support the Ministry’s efforts to modernize and adapt its national framework, where needed. This initiative represents an important step toward modernizing national inspection systems, strengthening compliance with international standards, and enhancing maritime safety and environmental protection.

CISA Helps Johnny Secure Operational Technology: New Guidance Addresses Cyber Risks from Legacy Protocols

CISA released the guidance Barriers to Secure OT Communication: Why Johnny Can’t Authenticate. This guidance highlights the known issues with insecure-by-design legacy industrial protocols and seeks to understand why the technology to secure these protocols is not widely adopted. CISA developed this guidance in partnership with operational technology (OT) equipment manufacturers and standard development organizations, by interviewing OT asset owners and operators to understand:
1. What motivates owners and operators to secure communication, and
2. What barriers prevent successful adoption from design through deployment and operations.
Legacy OT protocols lack strong protections against data alteration, device impersonation, and unauthorized access, making critical infrastructure vulnerable to cyber threats. Securing these protocols requires solutions that are practical for current operators as well as cyber experts. Based on the research conducted, CISA provides recommendations for how owners and operators can avoid the negative experiences of their peers, as well as recommendations to OT manufacturers to drive sustainable, more usable capabilities.
For OT Owners and Operators:
• Learn why message signing is the foundation for secure OT communication and when encryption is essential.
• Discover practical strategies for phased adoption of secure protocols to minimize operational risk.
• Identify which OT communications should be prioritized for enhanced security and resilience.
• Explore ways to simplify secure workflows and key management for easier implementation.
For Manufacturers:
• Gain insights from customer research to reduce customer friction and deliver more usable, secure products.
• Explore actionable recommendations to address cost and complexity barriers to secure communication.
• Learn how usability metrics like deployment time and ease of integration can differentiate your solutions and accelerate adoption.
CISA encourages critical infrastructure organizations and OT manufacturers to review and implement the recommendations in this guidance.

Ignitis Gamyba Allocates €1.1 Million in Humanitarian Aid for Ukraine’s Critical Infrastructure

From September 2024 to this October, Ignitis Gamyba allocated €1.1 million in humanitarian aid to support the restoration of Ukraine’s war‑damaged energy infrastructure. According to the European Commission, this is the largest logistical operation it has ever coordinated.
In just over a year, 145 lorries loaded with equipment were dispatched from the Vilnius TE‑3 Combined Heat and Power Plant. According to the company’s calculations, a total of 2,681 tonnes of equipment have been allocated for humanitarian aid.
“In this challenging period, as Ukraine experiences continued russian aggression and the destruction of its energy infrastructure, we remain firmly committed to supporting the Ukrainian people. Lithuania’s initiative to relocate a full thermal power plant, with a combined heat and electricity capacity of nearly 1,000 MW, to Ukraine through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a powerful example of solidarity and cooperation. A thermal power plant of this size can provide heating for approximately half of Vilnius households. This support is necessary to rebuild the energy sector, which is vital to the daily lives of Ukrainians. I am sincerely grateful to all the countries, companies and institutions involved in this massive project. This operation only became possible through the efforts of all of our partners,” says Minister of Energy Žygimantas Vaičiūnas.
The principal activities of Ignitis Gamyba’s TE‑3 were suspended in 2015 due to high operating costs and an assessment that operation of the power units would not have a significant impact on the stability of the electric power system.
“For more than 30 years, this power plant provided heating for roughly half of Vilnius households. Now it is no longer being used, but the equipment we preserved and kept operational was able to contribute to restoring vital functions in Ukraine,” said Ignitis Group CEO Darius Maikštėnas.
The transfer of equipment was officially confirmed on 15 July 2024, following the signing of a support agreement between Ignitis Gamyba and the electricity distribution network operator in Ukraine. For security reasons, more detailed information about the aid being provided, including the exact names of the equipment as well as the power plants it will be going to, cannot be disclosed.

Poland Energy Sector Cyber Incident Highlights OT and ICS Security Gaps

In December 2025, a malicious cyber actor(s) targeted and compromised operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) in Poland’s Energy Sector—specifically renewable energy plants, a combined heat and power plant, and a manufacturing sector company—in a cyber incident. The malicious cyber activity highlights the need for critical infrastructure entities with vulnerable edge devices to act now to strengthen their cybersecurity posture against cyber threat activities targeting OT and ICS.
A malicious cyber actor(s) gained initial access in this incident through vulnerable internet-facing edge devices, subsequently deploying wiper malware and causing damage to remote terminal units (RTUs). The malicious cyber activity caused loss of view and control between facilities and distribution system operators, destroyed data on human machine interfaces (HMIs), and corrupted system firmware on OT devices. While the affected renewable energy systems continued production, the system operator could not control or monitor them according to their intended design.
CERT Polska’s incident report highlights:
- Vulnerable edge devices remain a prime target for threat actors.
  - As indicated by CISA’s Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-02: Mitigating Risk From End-of-Support Edge Devices, end-of-support edge devices pose significant risks.
- OT devices without firmware verification can be permanently damaged.
  - Operators should prioritize updates that allow firmware verification when available; if updates are not immediately feasible, ensure that cyber incident response plans account for inoperative OT devices to mitigate prolonged outages.
- Threat actors leveraged default credentials, a vulnerability not limited to specific vendors, to pivot onto the HMI and RTUs.
  - Operators should immediately change default passwords and establish requirements for integrators or OT suppliers to enforce password changes in the future.
CISA and the Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (DOE CESER) urge OT asset owners and operators to review the following resources for more information about the malicious activity and mitigations:
- CERT Polska’s Energy Sector Incident Report - 29 December 2025.
- CISA’s joint fact sheet with FBI, EPA, and DOE Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology.
- DOE’s Energy Threat Analysis Center’s threat advisories.

€113 million in EU funding allocated to strengthen the resilience of Baltic and Polish electricity grids

The European Commission has allocated €113 million in funding from Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for critical Synchronisation infrastructure protection implemented by the transmission system operators of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. The implementation of wider range of projects aimed at ensuring energy security against potential cyber and physical threats began on February 9 last year, following the successful synchronization of the Baltic States with the Continental European electricity network.
“Having successfully completed the synchronization project, the Baltic States and Poland continue to invest in energy independence and security. We are grateful to the European Commission for supporting our ambition to make the Baltic Sea region a model for strengthening the security and resilience of critical energy infrastructure across Europe. This funding is the result of our consistent efforts and sets a new precedent, as until now the European Union had no dedicated financing for the protection of critical energy infrastructure. By consistently applying the lessons learned from Ukrainian energy specialists, we are expanding the scope of protection for our critical energy infrastructure projects. We plan to apply for further funding for resilience projects and are actively working to ensure that a long-term EU-level instrument for financing critical energy infrastructure protection is established,” – said Žygimantas Vaičiūnas, Minister of Energy of the Republic of Lithuania.
The protection of critical energy infrastructure is being financed on the EU level for the first time. These possibilities have been empowered due to the implementation of the synchronization project by the Baltic States and Poland. Lithuania together with Estonia, Latvia and Poland is targeting the long-term legal and financial instruments for the financing of the critical energy infrastructure within the EU. Currently the legal instruments are under review, it is expected and the efforts are pursued the initiative to be properly aligned also during the negotiations of Multiannual Financial Framework for 2028-2034.
“We launched the resilience programme just over a year ago, and we have already made significant progress in many areas: we have procured and are installing drone neutralization solutions, implemented initial protection measures for substation equipment, designed and prepared to build physical barriers – materials for which were tested at Lithuanian Armed Forces training grounds – and introduced measures to ensure rapid restoration of damaged infrastructure. We continue to raise the level of cybersecurity. By sharing information and insights with partners in the Baltic States and Poland, working with universities and security experts, and learning from Ukraine’s experience, we are constantly looking for ways to supplement and improve existing solutions,” said Litgrid CEO Rokas Masiulis.
The critical infrastructure protection projects implemented by the Baltic and Polish transmission system operators – Litgrid, AST, Elering, and PSE – as part of the Baltic synchronization effort will be financed through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF).
The projects will receive up to the maximum possible co financing rate of 50% of eligible costs. Funding for projects in Lithuania amounts to €22 million.
Litgrid’s energy infrastructure resilience programme includes strengthening the physical protection of critical facilities, establishing emergency and crisis reserves for transmission network equipment, installing electronic security systems, deploying unmanned aerial vehicle detection and neutralization systems, enhancing perimeter protection, and preparing to operate under critical conditions.
Litgrid is implementing 13 projects under the resilience programme, comprising more than 150 measures deployed across various transmission network facilities. The programme is continuously reviewed based on threat assessments and new technological solutions.
On February 8, 2025, the Baltic States disconnected from the Russia controlled IPS/UPS electricity system, and on February 9 successfully synchronized their electricity systems with the Continental European synchronous area. Synchronization with Continental Europe enables the Baltic States to operate their electricity systems in close cooperation with other Continental European countries, ensuring stable and reliable frequency regulation, thereby strengthening energy independence and enhancing energy security across the region. The Baltic States joined the Continental European network, which serves more than 400 million consumers in 26 countries.

Draft NIST Guidelines Rethink Cybersecurity for the AI Era

Artificial intelligence (AI) is impacting many organizations’ activities, and cybersecurity is no exception. For anyone interested in the opportunities and risks at the intersection of cybersecurity and AI, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released a preliminary draft of its Cyber AI Profile.
The publication, whose full title is the Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Artificial Intelligence (NISTIR 8596), offers guidelines for using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF 2.0) to accelerate the secure adoption of AI. The profile helps organizations think about how to strategically adopt AI while addressing emerging cybersecurity risks that stem from AI’s rapid advance.
“Regardless of where organizations are on their AI journey, they need cybersecurity strategies that acknowledge the realities of AI’s advancement,” said Barbara Cuthill, one of the profile’s authors.
The draft resulted from a yearlong effort on the part of NIST cybersecurity and AI experts. Over that time, more than 6,500 individuals have joined the community of interest to contribute to NIST’s development of the profile. After releasing an initial concept paper in February 2025, conducting a workshop the following April, and hosting a series of community of interest meetings in the summer, NIST is now releasing the preliminary draft of the profile for a 45-day public comment period.
The Cyber AI Profile centers on three focus areas:
- Securing AI systems: identifying cybersecurity challenges when integrating AI into organizational ecosystems and infrastructure
- Conducting AI-enabled cyber defense: identifying opportunities to use AI to enhance cybersecurity, and understanding challenges when leveraging AI to support defensive operations
- Thwarting AI-enabled cyberattacks: building resilience to protect against new AI-enabled threats
“The three focus areas reflect the fact that AI is entering organizations’ awareness in different ways,” Cuthill said. “But ultimately every organization will have to deal with all three.”
The Cyber AI Profile can help organizations use the CSF to crystallize their cybersecurity goals with respect to AI and CSF 2.0. The profile offers insights to help organizations understand, examine and address the cybersecurity concerns related to AI and thoughtfully integrate AI into their cybersecurity strategies.
NIST uses the term “community profile” to describe the application of CSF 2.0 to address shared interests and goals among organizations. The Cyber AI Profile joins other community profiles that NIST has created for the manufacturing, financial and telecommunications communities, among others.
The preliminary draft release is intended to seek feedback from the public to inform an initial public draft, which Cuthill says will further refine the profile and include mapping of additional relevant resources to the CSF. Following the 45-day comment period, NIST plans to develop the initial public draft for release in 2026.
When finalized, the profile will help organizations incorporate AI into their cybersecurity planning by suggesting key actions to prioritize, highlighting special considerations from specific parts of the CSF when considering AI, and providing mappings to other NIST resources, including the AI Risk Management Framework.
Cuthill said the authors hope to continue developing the profile as a tool that will prove useful to the community.
“The Cyber AI Profile is all about enabling organizations to gain confidence on their AI journey,” she said. “We hope it will help them feel equipped to have conversations about how their cybersecurity environment will change with AI and to augment what they are already doing with their cybersecurity programs.”

NIST Launches Centers for AI in Manufacturing and Critical Infrastructure

The U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has expanded its collaboration with the nonprofit MITRE Corporation as part of its efforts to ensure U.S. leadership in artificial intelligence (AI). Through this award, NIST is investing $20 million to establish two centers to advance the delivery of AI-based technology solutions to strengthen U.S. manufacturing and cybersecurity for critical infrastructure.
“This investment will help accelerate the application of AI in American manufacturing and help drive the American manufacturing renaissance,” said Deputy Secretary of Commerce Paul Dabbar. “We can harness AI to increase the competitiveness of our manufacturers and attract investment in America.”
The award is an important step in implementing NIST’s Strategy for American Technology Leadership in the 21st Century to accelerate the progress of critical and emerging technologies from development to adoption, in close partnership with U.S. industry.
“Our goal is to remove barriers to American AI innovation and accelerate the application of our AI technologies around the world,” said Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting NIST Director Craig Burkhardt. “This new agreement with MITRE will focus on enhancing the ability of U.S. companies to make high-value products more efficiently, meet market demands domestically and internationally, and catalyze discovery and commercialization of new technologies and devices.”
The AI Economic Security Center for U.S. Manufacturing Productivity and the AI Economic Security Center to Secure U.S. Critical Infrastructure from Cyberthreats will drive the development and adoption of AI-driven tools, or “agents,” in these two national priority areas. The centers will develop the technology evaluations and advancements that are necessary to effectively protect U.S. dominance in AI innovation, address threats from adversaries’ use of AI, and reduce risks from reliance on insecure AI.
NIST will rely on existing resources to build on its expertise and carry forward recommendations in the White House’s July 2025 America’s AI Action Plan, including Pillar I: Accelerate AI Innovation and Pillar II: Build American AI Infrastructure.
These are important first steps in NIST’s programmatic plan to coordinate innovation-based research efforts for accelerating the development and deployment of critical technologies in areas of national priority. Building on its long history of public-private collaboration, NIST plans to use adaptive and flexible partnerships to develop, pilot and implement new advances to establish U.S. leadership and innovation in critical and emerging technologies such as AI, quantum information science and technology, and biotechnology.
The partnership will leverage MITRE’s long-standing mission to operate federally funded research and development centers. NIST expects the AI centers to enable breakthroughs in applied science and advanced technology and deliver disruptive innovative solutions to tackle the most pressing challenges facing the nation.
This agreement expands NIST’s portfolio of AI-focused programs and builds on the private-public partnerships leveraged by the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), which leads evaluations of U.S. and adversary systems and contributes to NIST’s efforts to develop best practices. CAISI has established voluntary agreements with multiple developers of leading-edge or “frontier” AI models to enable collaborative research and voluntary testing of industry models for priority national security capabilities.
In the coming months, NIST plans to announce its award for the AI for Resilient Manufacturing Institute, through the Manufacturing USA program. With up to $70 million in investment over a five-year period from NIST and at least that much in nonfederal funding, the institute will bring together expertise in AI, manufacturing and supply chain networks to promote manufacturing resilience.
Combined, these efforts will enhance NIST’s core research, standards and technology mission to tackle barriers preventing U.S. innovation and leadership in AI.

NSA Releases First in Series of Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines

The National Security Agency (NSA) is releasing the first two products in a series of Zero Trust Implementation Guidelines (ZIGs) to provide practical, actionable recommendations to facilitate the implementation of Zero Trust (ZT).
This series of reports outlines the steps to implement the technologies and processes that support achieving the Target-level ZT Capabilities, Activities, and Expected Outcomes described in the Department of War (DoW) CIO ZT Framework.
The Primer and Discovery Phase are the gateway to ZT implementation, providing guidance and direction to ensure organizations are fully equipped to digest and implement the Phase 1 and Phase 2 ZIGs upon their release.
The Primer outlines the strategy and principles used to develop the ZIGs and provides a holistic approach to maximizing the usage of the series. Notably, the ZIGs are designed to be modular, allowing organizations at different levels of ZT maturity to select and implement the capabilities most relevant to the needs of their environment.
The Discovery Phase is intended to help organizations establish foundational visibility and understand the critical data, applications, assets, and services, as well as access and authorization activity existing within the architecture. The goal of this initial phase is to enable informed prioritization and planning by creating a reliable baseline that supports effective ZT implementation.
System owners, cybersecurity professionals, and stakeholders should review these foundational guidelines to gain a deeper understanding of ZT activities and their organization’s operational landscape in preparation for the release of the Phase 1 and Phase 2 ZIGs.
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