CISA Issue Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance

CISA and its partners, through the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, are responding to active, widespread exploitation of a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in Apache’s Log4j software library, versions 2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1, known as "Log4Shell" and "Logjam." Log4j is very broadly used in a variety of consumer and enterprise services, websites, and applications—as well as in operational technology products—to log security and performance information. An unauthenticated remote actor could exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system.

Apache released Log4j version 2.15.0 in a security update to address the CVE-2021-44228 vulnerability. However, in order for the vulnerability to be remediated in products and services that use affected versions of Log4j, the maintainers of those products and services must implement this security update. Users of such products and services should refer to the vendors of these products/services for security updates. Given the severity of the vulnerability and the likelihood of an increase in exploitation by sophisticated cyber threat actors, CISA urges vendors and users to take the following actions.

Vendors
Immediately identify, mitigate, and patch affected products using Log4j.
Inform your end users of products that contain this vulnerability and strongly urge them to prioritize software updates.
Affected Organizations
In addition to the immediate actions—to (1) enumerate external-facing devices that have Log4j, (2) ensure your SOC actions alerts on these devices, and (3) install a WAF with rules that automatically update—as noted in the box above, review CISA's upcoming GitHub repository

for a list of affected vendor information and apply software updates as soon as they are available. See Actions for Organizations Running Products with Log4j below for additional guidance. Note: CISA has added CVE-2021-44228 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, which was created according to Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities. In accordance with BOD 22-01, federal civilian executive branch agencies must mitigate CVE-2021-44228 by December 24, 2021.

Technical Details

This RCE vulnerability—affecting Apache’s Log4j library, versions 2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1—exists in the action the Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) takes to resolve variables. According to the CVE-2021-44228 listing, affected versions of Log4j contain JNDI features—such as message lookup substitution—that "do not protect against adversary-controlled LDAP [Lightweight Directory Access Protocol] and other JNDI related endpoints."

An adversary can exploit this vulnerability by submitting a specially crafted request to a vulnerable system that causes that system to execute arbitrary code. The request allows the adversary to take full control over the system. The adversary can then steal information, launch ransomware, or conduct other malicious activity.
Actions for Organizations Running Products with Log4j

CISA recommends affected entities:

Review Apache’s Log4j Security Vulnerabilities page for additional information and, if appropriate, apply the provided workaround:
In releases >=2.10, this behavior can be mitigated by setting either the system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or the environment variable LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS to true.
For releases from 2.7 through 2.14.1 all PatternLayout patterns can be modified to specify the message converter as %m{nolookups} instead of just %m.
For releases from 2.0-beta9 to 2.7, the only mitigation is to remove the JndiLookup class from the classpath: zip -q -d log4j-core-*.jar org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class.
Apply available patches immediately. See CISA's upcoming GitHub repository for known affected products and patch information.

Prioritize patching, starting with mission critical systems, internet-facing systems, and networked servers. Then prioritize patching other affected information technology and operational technology assets.
Until patches are applied, set log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups to true by adding -Dlog4j2.formatMsgNoLookups=True to the Java Virtual Machine command for starting your application. Note: this may impact the behavior of a system’s logging if it relies on Lookups for message formatting. Additionally, this mitigation will only work for versions 2.10 and above.
As stated above, BOD 22-01 directs federal civilian agencies to mitigate CVE-2021-44228 by December 24, 2021, as part of the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog.

Conduct a security review to determine if there is a security concern or compromise. The log files for any services using affected Log4j versions will contain user-controlled strings.
Consider reporting compromises immediately to CISA and the FBI.
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DHS Announces New Cybersecurity Requirements for Surface Transportation Owners and Operators

DHS’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has announced two new Security Directives and additional guidance for voluntary measures to strengthen cybersecurity across the transportation sector in response to the ongoing cybersecurity threat to surface transportation systems and associated infrastructure. These actions are among several steps DHS is taking to increase the cybersecurity of U.S. critical infrastructure.

“These new cybersecurity requirements and recommendations will help keep the traveling public safe and protect our critical infrastructure from evolving threats,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas. “DHS will continue working with our partners across every level of government and in the private sector to increase the resilience of our critical infrastructure nationwide.”

TSA is increasing the cybersecurity of the transportation sector through Security Directives, appropriately tailored regulations, and voluntary engagement with key stakeholders. In developing its approach, including these new Security Directives, TSA sought input from industry stakeholders and federal partners, including the Department’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which provided expert guidance on cybersecurity threats to the transportation network and countermeasures to defend against them.

The TSA Security Directives announced today target higher-risk freight railroads, passenger rail, and rail transit, based on a determination that these requirements need to be issued immediately to protect transportation security. These Directives require owners and operators to:

- designate a cybersecurity coordinator;
- report cybersecurity incidents to CISA within 24 hours;
- develop and implement a cybersecurity incident response plan to reduce the risk of an operational disruption; and,
- complete a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment to identify potential gaps or vulnerabilities in their systems.

TSA is also releasing guidance recommending that all other lower-risk surface transportation owners and operators voluntarily implement the same measures. Further, TSA recently updated its aviation security programs to require that airport and airline operators implement the first two provisions above. TSA intends to expand the requirements for the aviation sector and issue guidance to smaller operators. TSA also expects to initiate a rule-making process for certain surface transportation entities to increase their cybersecurity resiliency.

These efforts are part of a series of new steps to prioritize cybersecurity across DHS. Secretary Mayorkas first outlined his vision for the Department’s cybersecurity priorities in March, which included a series of focused 60-day sprints designed to elevate existing work, remove roadblocks to progress, and launch new initiatives and partnerships to achieve DHS’s cybersecurity mission and implement Biden-Harris Administration priorities. To learn more about the sprints, please visit www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity.

2nd edition of National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide Launched

The Guide to Developing a National Cybersecurity Strategy is one of the most comprehensive overviews of what constitute successful cybersecurity strategies. It is the result of a unique, collaborative, and equitable multi-stakeholder effort.

Over the last two decades, people worldwide have benefitted from the growth and adoption of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and associated socio-economic and political opportunities. Digital transformation can be a powerful enabler of inclusive and sustainable development, but only if the underlying infrastructure and services that depend on it are safe, secure, and resilient. To reap the benefits and manage the challenges of digitalization, countries need to frame the proliferation of ICT-enabled infrastructures and services within a comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy.

To help governments in this endeavour, a consortium of partner organisations jointly developed and published the first Guide to Developing a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) in 2018. Since then, the number of national cybersecurity strategies or frameworks worldwide has increased significantly. In 2018, only 76 countries had adopted a strategy while today more than 127 countries have such strategies in place, and many have used the Guide as a reference and blueprint.1

However, the fast-changing nature of cyberspace, the increased dependency on ICT, and the proliferation of digital risks all call for continuous improvements to national cybersecurity strategies. Most countries have both accelerated their digital transformation and become increasingly concerned about the immediate and future threats to their critical services, infrastructures, sectors, institutions, and businesses, as well as to international peace and security, that could result from the misuse of digital technologies and inadequate resilience.

This second edition of the Guide could not come at a more critical time. The updated content reflects the complex and evolving nature of cyberspace, as well as the main trends that can impact cybersecurity and should, therefore, be included into national strategic planning. The objective of the Guide is to instigate strategic thinking and continue supporting national leaders and policy-makers in the ongoing development, establishment, and implementation of such national cybersecurity strategies and policies. We are confident that this new Guide will serve as a useful tool for all stakeholders with cybersecurity responsibilities.

The purpose of the report is to guide national leaders and policy-makers in the development of a National Cybersecurity Strategy, and in thinking strategically about cybersecurity, cyber-preparedness and resilience.

This Guide aims to provide a useful, flexible and user-friendly framework to set the context of a country’s socio-economic vision and current security posture and to assist policy-makers in the development of a Strategy that takes into consideration a country’s specific situation, cultural and societal values, and that encourages the pursuit of secure, resilient, ICT-enhanced and connected societies.

The Guide is a unique resource, as it provides a framework that has been agreed on by organisations with demonstrated and diverse experience in this topic area and builds on their prior work in this space. As such, it offers the most comprehensive overview to date of what constitutes successful national cybersecurity strategies.

Risk Management: Helping the EU Railways Catch the Cybersecurity Train

European railway undertakings (RUs) and infrastructure managers (IMs) need to address cyber risks in a systematic way as part of their risk management processes. This need has become even more urgent since the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive came into force in 2016.

Objectives of the Railway Cybersecurity report

The purpose of the report is to provide European RUs and IMs with applicable methods and practical examples on how to assess and mitigate cyber risks.

The good practices presented are based on feedback from railway stakeholders. They include tools, such as assets and services list, cyber threat scenarios and applicable cybersecurity measures, based on the standards and good practices used in the sector. These resources can be used as a basis for cyber risk management for railway companies. They are therefore intended to be a reference point and to promote collaboration between railway stakeholders across the EU while raising awareness on relevant threats.

The main takeaways

  • Existing risk management approaches vary for railway IT and OT systems

For the risk management of railway Information Technology (IT) systems, the most cited approaches were the requirements of NIS Directive at a national level, the ISO 2700x family of standards, and the NIST cybersecurity framework.

For Operational Technology (OT) systems, the frameworks cited were ISA/IEC 62443, CLC/TS 50701, and the recommendations of the Shift2Rail project X2Rail-3, or the ones from the CYRail Project.

Those standards or approaches are often used in a complementary way to adequately address both IT and OT systems. While IT systems are normally evaluated with broader and more generic methods (such as ISO 2700x or NIS Directive), OT systems need specific methods and frameworks that have been designed for industrial train systems.

There is no unified approach available to railway cyber risk management yet. Stakeholders who participated in this study indicated that they use a combination of the abovementioned international and European approaches to tackle risk management, which they then complement with national frameworks and methodologies.

  • Asset taxonomies

For RUs and IMs to manage cyber risks, identifying what needs protection is essential. In this report, a comprehensive list is broken down to 5 areas; the services that stakeholders provide, the devices (technological systems) that support these services, the physical equipment used to provide these services, the people that maintain or use them, and the data used.

  • Threats taxonomies and risk scenarios

RUs and IMs need to identify which cyber threats are applicable to their assets and services. The report reviews available threat taxonomies, and provides a list of threats that can be used as the basis.

Examples of cyber risk scenarios are also analysed, which can assist railway stakeholders when performing a risk analysis. They show how asset and threat taxonomies can be used together and are based on the known incidents of the sector and the feedback received during the workshops.

  • Applying cybersecurity measures

Each scenario is associated with a list of relevant security measures. The report includes cybersecurity measures derived from the NIS Directive, current standards (ISO/IEC 27002, IEC 62443) and good practises (NIST’s cybersecurity framework).

Joint global ransomware operation sees arrests and criminal network dismantled

A four-year operation across five continents has disrupted a ransomware cybercrime gang and seen the arrest of seven suspects believed to be behind global malware crime operations.

Codenamed ‘Quicksand’ (GoldDust) and carried out by 19 law enforcement agencies in 17 countries, the transcontinental operation saw officers collect and examine intelligence to establish a global threat picture about attacks by ransomware families - particularly GandCrab and Revil-Sodinokibi - and the suspects behind them.

The organized crime group that used these malwares is known for breaking into business and private networks using a range of infiltration techniques, and then deploying ransomware against their victims. The ransomware then encrypts files which are then used to blackmail companies and people into paying huge ransoms.

The suspects arrested during Operation Quicksand are suspected of perpetrating tens of thousands of ransomware infections and demanding more than EUR 200 million in ransom
Tangible results: multiple arrests worldwide

Intelligence exchanged during the operation enabled:

- Korean law enforcement to arrest three suspects in February, April and October;
- Kuwaiti authorities to arrest a man thought to have carried out ransomware attacks using the GandGrab ransomware;
- Romanian authorities to arrest two individuals suspected of ransomware cyber-attacks and believed to be responsible for 5,000 infections as well as half a million euros profit in ransom payments;
- The arrest of a man believed to be responsible for the Kaseya ransomware attack, thought to have been carried out last July by the REvil gang with more than 1,500 people and 1,000 businesses affected worldwide.

“Ransomware has become too large of a threat for any entity or sector to address alone; the magnitude of this challenge urgently demands united global action which INTERPOL can uniquely facilitate as a neutral and trusted global partner,” said INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock.

“Policing needs to harness the insights of the cyber security industry to identify and disrupt cyber criminals as part of a true coalition, working together to reduce the global impact of ransomware cybercrime,” added the Secretary General.

A powerful global coalition

A joint INTERPOL-Europol operation, Quicksand was coordinated from INTERPOL’s Cyber Fusion Centre in Singapore where stakeholders shared live intelligence in an interactive and secure environment via INTERPOL’s global network and capabilities.

Through INTERPOL’s Gateway project, INTERPOL’s private partners Trend Micro, CDI, Kaspersky Lab and Palo Alto Networks also contributed to investigations by sharing information and technical expertise.
Gateway boosts law enforcement and private industry partnerships to generate threat data from multiple sources and enable police authorities to prevent attacks.

Bitdefender supported operations by releasing tailor-made decryption tools to unlock ransomware and enable victims to recover files. These innovative tools enabled more than 1,400 companies to decrypt their networks, saving them almost EUR 475 million in potential losses.

IOCTA 2021 unveils the most recent cyber threat (r)evolutions

The accelerated digitalisation related to the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly influenced the development of a number of cyber threats, according to the new edition of Europol’s Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment. Criminals have been quick to abuse the current circumstances to increase profits, spreading their tentacles to various areas and exposing vulnerabilities, connected to systems, hospitals or individuals. While ransomware groups have taken advantage of widespread teleworking, scammers have abused COVID-19 fears and the fruitless search for cures online to defraud victims or gain access to their bank accounts. The increase of online shopping in general has attracted more fraudsters. With children spending a lot more time online, especially during lockdowns, grooming and dissemination of self-produced explicit material have increased significantly. Grey infrastructure, including services offering end-to-end encryption, VPNs and cryptocurrencies continue to be abused for the facilitation and proliferation of a large range of criminal activities. This has resulted in significant challenges for the investigation of criminal activities and the protection of victims of crime.

In addition to expanding the efforts to tackle these threats from a law enforcement perspective, it is crucial to add another level of protection in terms of cybersecurity. The implementation of measures such as multi-factor authentication and vulnerability management are of utmost importance to decrease the possible exposure to cyber threats. Awareness raising and prevention are key components in reducing the effectiveness of cyberattacks and other cyber enabled criminal activities.

The key threats:

- Ransomware affiliate programs enable a larger group of criminals to attack big corporations and public institutions by threatening them with multi-layered extortion methods such as DDoS attacks.
- Mobile malware evolves with criminals trying to circumvent additional security measures such as two-factor authentication.
- Online shopping has led to a steep increase in online fraud.
- Explicit self-generated material is an increasing concern and is also distributed for profit.
- Criminals continue to abuse legitimate services such as VPNs, encrypted communication services and cryptocurrencies.

The new edition of Europol’s Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment, launched today, looks into the (r)evolutionary development of these trends, catalysed by the expanded digitalisation of recent years. The report was presented during the Europol-INTERPOL Cybercrime Conference. The conference gathered about 100 experts together to share their insights into the latest cybercrime trends and threats and to discuss how innovation is essential in countering cybercrime acceleration.

CISA Releases Directive on Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, to drive urgent and prioritized remediation of vulnerabilities that are being actively exploited by adversaries. The Directive establishes a CISA-managed catalog of known exploited vulnerabilities and requires federal civilian agencies to remediate such vulnerabilities within specific timeframes.

CISA issued BOD 22-01 to drive federal agencies to mitigate actively exploited vulnerabilities on their networks, sending a clear message to all organizations across the country to focus patching on the subset of vulnerabilities that are causing harm now, and enable CISA to drive continuous prioritization of vulnerabilities based on our understanding of adversary activity. The Directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems, including those managed on agency premises or hosted by third parties on an agency’s behalf. With this Directive, CISA is imposing the first government-wide requirements to remediate vulnerabilities affecting both internet-facing and non-internet facing assets.

“Every day, our adversaries are using known vulnerabilities to target federal agencies. As the operational lead for federal cybersecurity, we are using our directive authority to drive cybersecurity efforts toward mitigation of those specific vulnerabilities that we know to be actively used by malicious cyber actors,” said CISA Director Jen Easterly. “The Directive lays out clear requirements for federal civilian agencies to take immediate action to improve their vulnerability management practices and dramatically reduce their exposure to cyber attacks. While this Directive applies to federal civilian agencies, we know that organizations across the country, including critical infrastructure entities, are targeted using these same vulnerabilities. It is therefore critical that every organization adopt this Directive and prioritize mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA’s public catalog.”

With over 18,000 vulnerabilities identified in 2020 alone, organizations in the public and private sector find it challenging to prioritize limited resources toward remediating the vulnerabilities that are most likely to result in a damaging intrusion. This Directive addresses this challenge by driving mitigations of those vulnerabilities that are being actively exploited to compromise federal agencies and American businesses, building upon existing methods widely used to prioritize vulnerabilities by many organizations today.

This Directive applies to federal civilian agencies however, CISA strongly recommends that private businesses and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) governments prioritize mitigation of vulnerabilities listed in CISA’s public catalog and sign up to receive notifications when new vulnerabilities are added.

Joint global ransomware operation sees arrests and criminal network dismantled

A four-year operation across five continents has disrupted a ransomware cybercrime gang and seen the arrest of seven suspects believed to be behind global malware crime operations.

Codenamed ‘Quicksand’ (GoldDust) and carried out by 19 law enforcement agencies in 17 countries, the transcontinental operation saw officers collect and examine intelligence to establish a global threat picture about attacks by ransomware families - particularly GandCrab and Revil-Sodinokibi - and the suspects behind them.

The organized crime group that used these malwares is known for breaking into business and private networks using a range of infiltration techniques, and then deploying ransomware against their victims. The ransomware then encrypts files which are then used to blackmail companies and people into paying huge ransoms.

The suspects arrested during Operation Quicksand are suspected of perpetrating tens of thousands of ransomware infections and demanding more than EUR 200 million in ransom

Intelligence exchanged during the operation enabled

- Korean law enforcement to arrest three suspects in February, April and October;
- Kuwaiti authorities to arrest a man thought to have carried out ransomware attacks using the GandGrab ransomware;
- Romanian authorities to arrest two individuals suspected of ransomware cyber-attacks and believed to be responsible for 5,000 infections as well as half a million euros profit in ransom payments;
- The arrest of a man believed to be responsible for the Kaseya ransomware attack, thought to have been carried out last July by the REvil gang with more than 1,500 people and 1,000 businesses affected worldwide.

“Ransomware has become too large of a threat for any entity or sector to address alone; the magnitude of this challenge urgently demands united global action which INTERPOL can uniquely facilitate as a neutral and trusted global partner,” said INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock.

“Policing needs to harness the insights of the cyber security industry to identify and disrupt cyber criminals as part of a true coalition, working together to reduce the global impact of ransomware cybercrime,” added the Secretary General.

A joint INTERPOL-Europol operation, Quicksand was coordinated from INTERPOL’s Cyber Fusion Centre in Singapore where stakeholders shared live intelligence in an interactive and secure environment via INTERPOL’s global network and capabilities.

Through INTERPOL’s Gateway project, INTERPOL’s private partners Trend Micro, CDI, Kaspersky Lab and Palo Alto Networks also contributed to investigations by sharing information and technical expertise.
Gateway boosts law enforcement and private industry partnerships to generate threat data from multiple sources and enable police authorities to prevent attacks.

Bitdefender supported operations by releasing tailor-made decryption tools to unlock ransomware and enable victims to recover files. These innovative tools enabled more than 1,400 companies to decrypt their networks, saving them almost EUR 475 million in potential losses.

KPN, McAfee, S2W helped investigations by providing cyber and malware technical expertise to INTERPOL and its member countries.

Operation Quicksand continues to supply evidence that is feeding into further cybercrime investigations and enabling the international police community to disrupt numerous channels used by cybercriminals to launder cryptocurrency and commit ransomware crime.

With the combined global financial impact in ransom payments from ransomware families believed to be within the billions of dollars and thousands of victims worldwide, INTERPOL’s private partners and member countries work together to provide support to victims hit by the ransomware.

Research from Chainalysis found that criminals made USD 350 million in 2020 from ransomware payments, representing an increase of 311 per cent in one year. Over the same period, the average ransom payment increased by 171 per cent, according to Palo Alto Networks.

12 targeted for involvement in ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure

A total of 12 individuals wreaking havoc across the world with ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure have been targeted as the result of a law enforcement and judicial operation involving eight countries.

These attacks are believed to have affected over 1 800 victims in 71 countries. These cyber actors are known for specifically targeting large corporations, effectively bringing their business to a standstill.

The actions took place in the early hours of 26 October in Ukraine and Switzerland. Most of these suspects are considered high-value targets because they are being investigated in multiple high-profile cases in different jurisdictions.

As the result of the action day, over USD 52 000 in cash was seized, alongside 5 luxury vehicles. A number of electronic devices are currently being forensically examined to secure evidence and identify new investigative leads.

The targeted suspects all had different roles in these professional, highly organised criminal organisations. Some of these criminals were dealing with the penetration effort, using multiple mechanisms to compromise IT networks, including brute force attacks, SQL injections, stolen credentials and phishing emails with malicious attachments.

Once on the network, some of these cyber actors would focus on moving laterally, deploying malware such as Trickbot, or post-exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike or PowerShell Empire, to stay undetected and gain further access.

The criminals would then lay undetected in the compromised systems, sometimes for months, probing for more weaknesses in the IT networks before moving on to monetising the infection by deploying a ransomware. These cyber actors are known to have deployed LockerGoga, MegaCortex and Dharma ransomware, among others.

The effects of the ransomware attacks were devastating as the criminals had had the time to explore the IT networks undetected. A ransom note was then presented to the victim, which demanded the victim pay the attackers in Bitcoin in exchange for decryption keys.

A number of the individuals interrogated are suspected of being in charge of laundering the ransom payments: they would funnel the Bitcoin ransom payments through mixing services, before cashing out the ill-gotten gains.
International cooperation

International cooperation coordinated by Europol and Eurojust was central in identifying these threat actors as the victims were located in different geographical locations around the world.

Initiated by the French authorities, a joint investigation team (JIT) was set up in September 2019 between Norway, France, the United Kingdom and Ukraine with financial support of Eurojust and assistance of both Agencies. The partners in the JIT have since been working closely together, in parallel with the independent investigations of the Dutch and U.S. authorities, to uncover the actual magnitude and complexity of the criminal activities of these cyber actors to establish a joint strategy.

Eurojust established a coordination centre to facilitate cross-border judicial cooperation during the action day. In preparation of this, seven coordination meetings were held.

Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) hosted operational meetings, provided digital forensic, cryptocurrency and malware support and facilitated the information exchange in the framework of the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) hosted at Europol’s headquarters in The Hague.

NSA and CISA provide cybersecurity guidance for 5G cloud infrastructures

The National Security Agency (NSA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have published cybersecurity guidance to securely build and configure cloud infrastructures in support of 5G. Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures: Prevent and Detect Lateral Movement is the first of a four-part series created by the Enduring Security Framework (ESF), a cross-sector, public-private working group which provides cybersecurity guidance that addresses high priority cyber-based threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure.

“This series provides key cybersecurity guidance to configure 5G cloud infrastructure,” said Natalie Pittore, Chief of ESF in NSA’s Cybersecurity Collaboration Center. “Our team examined priority risks so that we could provide useful guidance, disseminated in an actionable way to help implementers protect their infrastructure.”

The series builds on the ESF Potential Threat Vectors to 5G Infrastructure analysis paper released in May 2021, which focused specifically on threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigations that apply to the deployment of 5G infrastructures. Based on preliminary analysis and threat assessment, the top 5G cloud infrastructure security challenges were identified by ESF and a four-part series of instructional documents covering those challenges will be released over the next few weeks. Topics include securely isolating network resources; protecting data in transit, in use, and at rest; and ensuring integrity of the network infrastructure.

Part I focuses on detecting malicious cyber actor activity in 5G clouds to prevent the malicious cyberattack of a single cloud resource from compromising the entire network. The guidance provides recommendations for mitigating lateral movement attempts by malicious cyber actors who have successfully exploited a vulnerability to gain initial access into a 5G cloud system.
“This series exemplifies the national security benefits resulting from the joint efforts of ESF experts from CISA, NSA, and industry,” said Rob Joyce, NSA Cybersecurity Director. “Service providers and system integrators that build and configure 5G cloud infrastructures who apply this guidance will do their part to improve cybersecurity for our nation.”

“Strong and vibrant partnerships are critical to the overall effort to reduce cyber risk. Along with our public and private partners in the ESF, CISA is proud to partner with NSA to present the Security Guidance series for 5G Infrastructure,” said Alaina Clark, Assistant Director for Stakeholder Engagement. “Protecting 5G cloud infrastructure is a shared responsibility and we encourage 5G providers, operators and customers to review the new guidance.”

5G cloud providers, integrators, and network operators share the responsibility to detect and mitigate lateral movement attempts within their 5G cloud infrastructure. This document provides best practices to secure the 5G cloud from specific cyber threats of lateral movement that could compromise a network.

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