Ransomware Accounts for 54% of Cybersecurity Threats

The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) released its first cyber threat landscape for the health sector. The report found that ransomware accounts for 54% of cybersecurity threats in the health sector.

The comprehensive analysis maps and studies cyberattacks, identifying prime threats, actors, impacts, and trends for a period of over 2 years, providing valuable insights for the healthcare community and policy makers. The analysis is based on a total of 215 publicly reported incidents in the EU and neighbouring countries.

Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Juhan Lepassaar, said: “A high common level of cybersecurity for the healthcare sector in the EU is essential to ensure health organisations can operate in the safest way. The rise of the covid-19 pandemic showed us how we critically depend on health systems. What I consider as a wake-up call confirmed we need to get a clear view of the risks, the attack surface and the vulnerabilities specific to the sector. Access to incident reporting data must therefore be facilitated to better visualise and comprehend our cyber threat environment and identify the appropriate mitigation measures we need to implement.”

The findings

The report reveals a concerning reality of the challenges faced by the EU health sector during the reporting period.

- Widespread incidents. The European health sector experienced a significant number of incidents, with healthcare providers accounting for 53% of the total incidents. Hospitals, in particular, bore the brunt, with 42% of incidents reported. Additionally, health authorities, bodies and agencies (14%), and the pharmaceutical industry (9%) were targeted.
- Ransomware and data breaches. Ransomware emerged as one of the primary threats in the health sector (54% of incidents). This trend is seen as likely to continue. Only 27% of surveyed organisations in the health sector have a dedicated ransomware defence programme. Driven by financial gain, cybercriminals extort both health organisations and patients, threatening to disclose data, personal or sensitive in nature. Patient data, including electronic health records, were the most targeted assets (30%). Alarmingly, nearly half of all incidents (46%) aimed to steal or leak health organisations' data.
- Impact and lessons learned by the COVID-19 Pandemic. It is essential to note that the reporting period coincided with a significant portion of the COVID-19 pandemic era, during which the healthcare sector became a prime target for attackers. Financially motivated threat actors, driven by the value of patient data, were responsible for the majority of attacks (53%). The pandemic saw multiple instances of data leakage from COVID-19-related systems and testing laboratories in various EU countries. Insiders and poor security practices, including misconfigurations, were identified as primary causes of these leaks. The incidents serve as a stark reminder of the importance of robust cybersecurity practices, particularly in times of urgent operational needs.
- Vulnerabilities in Healthcare Systems. Attacks on healthcare supply chains and service providers resulted in disruptions or losses to health organisations (7%). Such types of attacks are expected to remain significant in the future, given the risks posed by vulnerabilities in healthcare systems and medical devices. A recent study by ENISA revealed that healthcare organisations reported the highest number of security incidents related to vulnerabilities in software or hardware, with 80% of respondents citing vulnerabilities as the cause of more than 61% of their security incidents.
- Geopolitical Developments and DDoS Attacks. Geopolitical developments and hacktivist activity led to a surge in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by pro-Russian hacktivist groups against hospitals and health authorities in early 2023, accounting for 9% of total incidents. While this trend is expected to continue, the actual impact of these attacks remains relatively low.
- The incidents examined in the report had significant consequences for health organisations, primarily resulting in breaches or theft of data (43%) disrupted healthcare services (22%) and disrupted services not related to healthcare (26%). The report also highlights the financial losses incurred, with the median cost of a major security incident in the health sector estimated at €300,000 according to the ENISA NIS Investment 2022 study.
- Patient safety emerges as a paramount concern for the health community, given potential delays in triage and treatment caused by cyber incidents.

New report from the NIS Cooperation Group

The NIS Cooperation Group releases today its report on “Threats and risk management in the health sector – Under the NIS Directive”. As a first assessment on the measures currently in place, the study sheds light on the different cybersecurity challenges in risk mitigation faced by the EU health sector. Together with relevant threat taxonomies and cyber incident data, the report discloses business continuity and mitigation recommendations to limit the likelihood and impacts of a cyber related incident.

CISA and FBI Release #StopRansomware: CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploits MOVEit Vulnerability

The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and FBI released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploits MOVEit Vulnerability in response to a recent vulnerability exploitation attributed to CL0P Ransomware Gang. This [joint guide] provides indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) identified through FBI investigations as recently as May this year. Additionally, it provides immediate actions to help reduce the impact of CL0P ransomware.

The CL0P Ransomware Gang, also known as TA505, reportedly began exploiting a previously unknown SQL injection vulnerability in Progress Software's managed file transfer (MFT) solution known as MOVEit Transfer. Internet- facing MOVEit Transfer web applications were infected with a web shell named LEMURLOOT, which was then used to steal data from underlying MOVEit Transfer databases.

CISA and FBI encourage information technology (IT) network defenders to review the MOVEit Transfer Advisory and implement the recommended mitigations to reduce the risk of compromise. This joint CSA is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed TTPs and IOCs to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

Cyber Agencies and Allies Partner to Identify Russian Snake Malware Infrastructure Worldwide

The National Security Agency (NSA) and several partner agencies have identified infrastructure for Snake malware—a sophisticated Russian cyberespionage tool—in over 50 countries worldwide.

To assist network defenders in detecting Snake and any associated activity, the agencies are publicly releasing the joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), “Hunting Russian Intelligence “Snake” Malware” today.

The agencies, which include the NSA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), Canadian Cyber Security Centre (CCCS), United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK), Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), and New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) attribute Snake operations to a known unit within Center 16 of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). The international coalition has identified Snake malware infrastructure across North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australia, including the United States and Russia.

“Russian government actors have used this tool for years for intelligence collection,” said Rob Joyce, NSA Director of Cybersecurity. “Snake infrastructure has spread around the world. The technical details will help many organizations find and shut down the malware globally.”

Malicious cyber actors used Snake to access and exfiltrate sensitive international relations documents, as well as other diplomatic communications, through a victim in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country.

In the U.S., the FSB has victimized industries including education institutions, small businesses, and media organizations. Critical infrastructure sectors, such as local government, finance, manufacturing, and telecommunications, have also been impacted.

Typically, Snake malware is deployed to external-facing infrastructure nodes on a network. From there, it uses other tools, and techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) on the internal network to conduct additional exploitation operations.

CISA and Partners Release BianLian Ransomware Cybersecurity Advisory

CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) have released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) with known BianLian ransomware and data extortion group technical details. Microsoft and Sophos contributed to the advisory.
To reduce the likelihood and impact of BianLian and other ransomware incidents, CISA encourages organizations to implement mitigations recommended in this advisory. Mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

Germany and Ukraine hit two high-value ransomware targets

The German Regional Police (Landeskriminalamt Nordrhein-Westfalen) and the Ukrainian National Police (Націона́льна полі́ція Украї́ни), with support from Europol, the Dutch Police (Politie) and the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations, targeted suspected core members of the criminal group responsible for carrying out large-scale cyberattacks with the DoppelPaymer ransomware.

This ransomware appeared in 2019, when cybercriminals started using it to launch attacks against organisations and critical infrastructure and industries. Based on the BitPaymer ransomware and part of the Dridex malware family, DoppelPaymer used a unique tool capable of compromising defence mechanisms by terminating the security-related process of the attacked systems. The DoppelPaymer attacks were enabled by the prolific EMOTET malware.

The ransomware was distributed through various channels, including phishing and spam emails with attached documents containing malicious code — either JavaScript or VBScript. The criminal group behind this ransomware relied on a double extortion scheme, using a leak website launched by the criminal actors in early 2020. German authorities are aware of 37 victims of this ransomware group, all of them companies. One of the most serious attacks was perpetrated against the University Hospital in Düsseldorf. In the US, victims payed at least 40 million euros between May 2019 and March 2021.

During the simultaneous actions, German officers raided the house of a German national, who is believed to have played a major role in the DoppelPaymer ransomware group. Investigators are currently analysing the seized equipment to determine the suspect’s exact role in the structure of the ransomware group. At the same time, and despite the current extremely difficult security situation that Ukraine is currently facing due to the invasion by Russia, Ukrainian police officers interrogated a Ukrainian national who is also believed to be a member of the core DoppelPaymer group. The Ukrainian officers searched two locations, one in Kiev and one in Kharkiv. During the searches, they seized electronic equipment, which is currently under forensic examination.
Europol on-site to speed up forensic analysis of seized data

On the action days, Europol deployed three experts to Germany to cross-check operational information against Europol’s databases and to provide further operational analysis, crypto tracing and forensic support. The analysis of this data and other related cases is expected to trigger further investigative activities. Europol also set up a Virtual Command Post to connect the investigators and experts from Europol, Germany, Ukraine, the Netherlands and the United States in real time and to coordinate activities during the house searches. Europol’s Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) also supported the operation. This standing operational team consists of cybercrime liaison officers from different countries who work on high-profile cybercrime investigations.

From the beginning of the investigation, Europol facilitated the exchange of information, coordinated the international law enforcement cooperation and supported the operational activities. Europol also provided analytical support by linking available data to various criminal cases within and outside the EU, and supported the investigation with cryptocurrency, malware, decryption and forensic analysis.

CISA Launches Ransomware Warning Pilot for Critical Infrastructure

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency publicly announced that it has established a pilot program to identify vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure systems that are known to be exploited by ransomware groups and threat actors.

According to CISA, the ransomware vulnerability warning pilot—or RVWP—will “identify organizations with internet-accessible vulnerabilities commonly associated with known ransomware actors by using existing services, data sources, technologies and authorities, including our free Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning service.”

The RVWP first began on 30th January when CISA contacted 93 organizations “identified as running instances of Microsoft Exchange Service with a vulnerability called ‘ProxyNotShell,’ which has been widely exploited by ransomware actors.”

“This initial round of notifications demonstrated the effectiveness of this model in enabling timely risk reduction as we further scale the RVWP to additional vulnerabilities and organizations,” CISA said.

The pilot program was created in response to the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act, or CIRCIA, a 2022 law that required CISA “to develop and implement regulations requiring covered entities to report covered cyber incidents and ransomware payments” to the agency. CISA said the RVWP would be “coordinated by and aligned with the Joint Ransomware Task Force,” an interagency body that was also established by CIRCIA.

"Ransomware attacks continue to cause untenable levels of harm to organizations across the country, including target rich, resource poor entities like many school districts and hospitals,” Eric Goldstein, CISA’s executive assistant director for cybersecurity, said in a statement. “The RVWP will allow CISA to provide timely and actionable information that will directly reduce the prevalence of damaging ransomware incidents affecting American organizations.”

Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Espionage Activities

CISA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Republic of Korea’s Defense Security Agency and National Intelligence Service have released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Espionage Activities, to provide information on ransomware activity used by North Korean state-sponsored cyber to target various critical infrastructure sectors, especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector organizations.

The authoring agencies urge network defenders to examine their current cybersecurity posture and apply the recommended mitigations in this joint CSA, which include:

- Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
- Enable and enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.
- Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.

See Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Espionage Activities for ransomware actor’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, indicators of compromise, and recommended mitigations. Additionally, review StopRansomware.gov for more guidance on ransomware protection, detection, and response.

United States and Spain Announce the Development of a New Capacity Building Tool to Combat Ransomware

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in partnership with the U.S. Department of State and the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, announced a joint project to develop a capacity-building tool to help countries utilize public-private partnerships (PPPs) to combat ransomware. This project was developed as part of the Second International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) Summit, which was convened in Washington, D.C. The CRI is a global coalition of 36 partner nations and the European Union dedicated to confronting the scourge of ransomware.

The CRI’s Public-Private Partnership (P3) Working Group, chaired by Spain, has focused on the essential need for close collaboration between governments and the private sector to address the challenges posed by ransomware. This tool will provide much needed guidance to nations around the world seeking to develop or deepen such public-private partnerships.

“Building capacity across the world is an essential aspect of our fight against ransomware,” said Brandon Wales, CISA Executive Director. “By learning from each other—public and private sector alike—and sharing that knowledge more broadly, we can effectively protect the critical infrastructure necessary to sustain not only American society, but the global institutions and networks upon which it relies.”

“Spain has the strong conviction that this project will contribute in a decisive manner to expose the most innovative state of the art of PPP best practices to fight against ransomware, said Guillermo Ardizone Garcίa, Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Thereby, all multi-stakeholders and partners involved in the CRI will be benefited from this line of action. Spain will actively encourage state and non-state stakeholders to join in this project poised to broadly share the PPP best practices, including creative financing schemes.”

When completed, the tool will feature a series of case studies of PPPs that have been used in the counter-ransomware fight, including those pioneered by members of the CRI P3 Working Group. The tool will highlight the features that made these efforts successful and will be designed to provide practical guidance to countries looking to implement their own PPPs as part of their national counter-ransomware efforts.

To develop the tool, the United States and Spain are partnering with the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), a global leader in cyber capacity building that will commission experts to deliver the tool. Other CRI members have been invited to provide additional financial and practical support to the project.

UK and allies expose Iranian state agency for exploiting cyber vulnerabilities for ransomware operations

The UK and international allies have issued a joint cyber security advisory highlighting that cyber actors affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are exploiting vulnerabilities to launch ransomware operations against multiple sectors.

Iranian-state APT actors have been observed actively targeting known vulnerabilities on unprotected networks, including in critical national infrastructure (CNI) organisations.

The advisory, published by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) − a part of GCHQ − alongside agencies from the US, Australia and Canada, sets out tactics and techniques used by the actors, as well as steps for organisations to take to mitigate the risk of compromise.

It updates an advisory issued in November 2021 which provided information about Iranian APT actors exploiting known Fortinet and Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities.

They are now assessed to be affiliated to the IRGC and are continuing to exploit these vulnerabilities, as well as the Log4j vulnerabilities, to provide them with initial access, leading to further malicious activity including data extortion and disk encryption.

Paul Chichester, NCSC Director of Operations, said:

"This malicious activity by actors affiliated with Iran’s IRGC poses an ongoing threat and we are united with our international partners in calling it out.

“We urge UK organisations to take this threat seriously and follow the advisory’s recommendations to mitigate the risk of compromise.”

The NCSC urges organisations to follow the mitigation set out in the advisory, including:

- Keeping systems and software updated and prioritising remediating known exploited vulnerabilities
- Enforcing multi-factor authentication
- Making offline backups of your data

This advisory has been issued by the NCSC, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), US Cyber Command (USCC), Department of the Treasury (DoT), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) and the Canadian Centre for Cybersecurity (CCCS).

French hospital forced to transfer patients following Ransomware attack

The Centre Hospitalier Sud Francilien (CHSF) said an attack on its computer network was detected in August. The hospital has referred patients elsewhere as the cyberattack rendered various technical systems ‘inaccessible’.

The cyberattack made various systems “inaccessible” including business software, storage systems in areas such as medical imaging, and the info systems on patient admissions, according to a CHSF statement.

As a result of the attack, patients whose care requires access to the hospital’s technical systems have been redirected to other hospitals in the area. Those who present themselves to the emergency room are being evaluated by CHSF’s medical staff, and being transferred to other institutions if necessary.

The hospital, which serves an area of around 600,000 people, said that measures have been taken to care for those already hospitalised there. However, the “exceptional situation” is expected to have an impact on the operating room, as it is closely linked to the affected technical platform.

French paper Le Monde reports that a ransom of $10m was demanded by the hackers responsible.

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