UNISDR Report: Words into Action guideline: Man-made/technological hazards

The UNISDR has issues a report that takes a practical approach in addressing man-made and technological hazards, and builds upon previous analyses and recommendations relating to such hazards in the context of DRR.
The number and magnitude of man-made disasters worldwide have risen since the 1970s and continue to grow in both frequency and impact on human wellbeing and economies, particularly in low and middle-income countries.
Several major technological accidents and the increased number of new hazardous substances and materials have highlighted the need to tackle these hazards within the overall frame of inclusive disaster risk management. Paragraph 15 of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 leaves no doubt about the need to address hazards comprehensively as it applies to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters, caused by both natural and man-made hazards as well as related environmental, technological and biological hazards and risks. It aims to guide the management of disaster risk at all levels as well as within and across all sectors.
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) is the focal point of the United Nations system for disaster risk reduction and the custodian of the Sendai Framework, supporting countries and societies in its implementation, monitoring and review of progress.
In accordance with the Sendai Framework, this guide seeks to address man-made hazards by strengthening national and local disaster management plans to include these hazards and by raising awareness of their risks and impacts. Furthermore, it will be a valuable tool to support training and capacity building.
This guide provides a set of evidence-based, practical activities for implementation for chemical, industrial and transport accidents, and nuclear and radiological hazards under the Sendai Framework’s four priorities for action. The guide highlights the existing diversity of thematic frameworks, institutional and legal mechanisms at global and regional levels that are related to and used for addressing man-made hazards. It also draws attention to existing collaborations within the disaster risk reduction community and key partners.
The Guide builds on the outcomes of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Indicators and Terminology for the Sendai Framework, and the work on hazard classification and terminology related to man-made hazards.
Full guide is available here >>

GAO Report: Opportunities Exist for DOE to Better Support Utilities in Improving Resilience to Hurricanes

Hurricanes are a leading cause of major power outages in the U.S., impacting millions of customers in recent years. Utilities in hurricane-affected states have invested in ways to better equip their grids to withstand and rapidly recover from hurricanes. For example, some utilities have elevated equipment to protect grid infrastructure from flooding.
The Department of Energy and its National Laboratories are developing planning tools, such as metrics to track grid resilience. However, we recommended that DOE create a plan to better guide these efforts and to better inform utilities about available resources at its National Labs.
Since 2012, utilities have taken steps to improve grid resilience to severe hurricanes, such as (1) implementing storm hardening measures to enable the grid to better withstand the effects of hurricanes; (2) adopting technologies to enhance operational capacity and help quickly restore service following disruptions; and (3) participating in mutual aid programs with other utilities and training and planning exercises. For example, utilities have implemented storm hardening measures that include elevating facilities and constructing flood walls to protect against storm surges. Utilities have also adopted technologies that enhance communication capabilities and monitor systems to detect, locate, and repair sources of disruptions. However, these utilities reported challenges justifying grid resilience investments to obtain regulatory approval, and some utilities have limited resources to pursue such enhancements.
Various federal agencies can provide funding for efforts to enhance grid resilience to hurricanes, including the Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, eligibility for most federal funding for grid resilience, including some USDA and FEMA funding, is limited to publicly owned utilities and state, tribal, and local governments. The Department of Energy (DOE) does not provide direct funding for grid resilience improvements, but it has efforts under way, including through its National Laboratories, to provide technical assistance and promote research and collaboration with utilities. DOE has also initiated preliminary efforts to develop tools for resilience planning, including resilience metrics and other tools such as a framework for planning, but DOE does not have a plan to guide these efforts. Without a plan to guide DOE efforts to develop tools for resilience planning, utilities may continue to face challenges justifying resilience investments. In addition, DOE lacks a formal mechanism to inform utilities about the efforts of its National Laboratories. Such a mechanism would help utilities leverage existing resources for improving grid resilience to hurricanes.
Hurricanes pose significant threats to the electricity grid in some U.S. coastal areas and territories and are a leading cause of major power outages. In recent years, hurricanes have impacted millions of customers in these areas. Adoption of technologies and other measures could improve the resilience of the grid so that it is better able to withstand and rapidly recover from severe weather; this could help mitigate the effects of hurricanes.
This report examines (1) measures utilities in selected states have adopted to enhance grid resilience following major hurricanes since 2012 and any challenges utilities face funding such measures; and (2) federal efforts to support the adoption of measures to enhance grid resilience to hurricanes and any opportunities that exist to improve these efforts. For this report, GAO assessed agency and industry actions; reviewed relevant reports, policies, and documents; and interviewed federal, industry, and local officials.
GAO recommends that DOE (1) establish a plan to guide its efforts to develop tools for resilience planning, and (2) develop a mechanism to better inform utilities about grid resilience efforts at the National Laboratories. DOE agreed in principle with these recommendations, but its proposed actions do not fully address GAO's concerns.
Full report can be found here >>

Climate Change Is Expected to Have Far-reaching Effects and DOE and FERC Should Take Actions

Climate change is expected to affect every aspect of the electricity grid—from generation, transmission, and distribution, to demand for electricity. For example, more frequent droughts and changing rainfall patterns may diminish hydroelectricity in some areas, and increasing wildfires may damage transmission lines.
We testified about how the Department of Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission could enhance grid resilience. We recommended that DOE develop a strategy for doing so and coordinate efforts within the department, and that FERC assess grid risks and plan how to promote resilience.
Climate change is expected to have far-reaching effects on the electricity grid that could cost billions and could affect every aspect of the grid from generation, transmission, and distribution to demand for electricity, according to several reports GAO reviewed. The type and extent of these effects on the grid will vary by geographic location and other factors. For example, reports GAO reviewed stated that more frequent droughts and changing rainfall patterns may adversely affect hydroelectricity generation in Alaska and the Northwest and Southwest regions of the United States. Further, transmission capacity may be reduced or distribution lines damaged during increasing wildfire activity in some regions due to warmer temperatures and drier conditions. Moreover, climate change effects on the grid could cost utilities and customers billions, including the costs of power outages and infrastructure damage.
Since 2014, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken actions to enhance the resilience of the grid. For example, in 2015, DOE established a partnership with 18 utilities to plan for climate change. In 2018, FERC collected information from grid operators on grid resilience and their risks to hazards such as extreme weather. Nevertheless, opportunities exist for DOE and FERC to take additional actions to enhance grid resilience to climate change. For example, DOE identified climate change as a risk to energy infrastructure, including the grid, but it does not have an overall strategy to guide its efforts. GAO's Disaster Resilience Framework states that federal efforts can focus on risk reduction by creating resilience goals and linking those goals to an overarching strategy. Developing and implementing a department-wide strategy that defines goals and measures progress could help prioritize DOE's climate resilience efforts to ensure that resources are targeted effectively. Regarding FERC, it has not taken steps to identify or assess climate change risks to the grid and, therefore, is not well positioned to determine the actions needed to enhance resilience. Risk management involves identifying and assessing risks to understand the likelihood of impacts and their associated consequences. By doing so, FERC could then plan and implement appropriate actions to respond to the risks and achieve its objective of promoting resilience.
According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program, changes in the earth's climate are under way and expected to increase, posing risks to the electricity grid that may affect the nation's economic and national security. Annual costs of weather-related power outages total billions of dollars and may increase with climate change, although resilience investments could help address potential effects, according to the research program. Private companies own most of the electricity grid, but the federal government plays a significant role in promoting grid resilience—the ability to adapt to changing conditions; withstand potentially disruptive events; and, if disrupted, to rapidly recover. DOE, the lead agency for grid resilience efforts, conducts research and provides information and technical assistance to industry. FERC reviews mandatory grid reliability standards.
This testimony summarizes GAO's report on grid resilience to climate change. Specifically, the testimony discusses (1) potential climate change effects on the electricity grid; and (2) actions DOE and FERC have taken since 2014 to enhance electricity grid resilience to climate change effects, and additional actions these agencies could take. GAO reviewed reports and interviewed agency officials and 55 relevant stakeholders.

DOE Announces $30 Million for Quantum Information Science to Tackle Emerging 21st Century Challenges

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced plans to provide $30 million for Quantum Information Science (QIS) research that helps scientists understand how nature works on an extremely small scale—100,000 times smaller than the diameter of a human hair. QIS can help our nation solve some of the most pressing and complex challenges of the 21st century, from climate change to national security. Watch this video to learn more about QIS.
“Quantum computing and devices are poised to revolutionize the way we process information and develop new technologies that are currently beyond our reach,” said Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm. “From developing novel materials to building better batteries to moving clean electricity across the country more efficiently, the field of quantum information sciences can help us accelerate discoveries to solve complex problems in energy and beyond.”
QIS helps researchers discover new ways to measure, analyze, process, and communicate information. Potential applications for this work range from quantum computers to enable complex power forecasting to prevent outages during extreme weather events, to quantum devices to enable new smart windows, clothes, and buildings that can change their properties on demand.
“Quantum information sciences have become essential tools for our National Labs to take on the challenges of the modern world,” said Senator Ben Ray Luján. “This strong investment in the Department’s NSRCs will support their cutting-edge discoveries and strengthen America’s competitiveness in this emerging field. The Nation’s future is inextricably tied to the future of our National Labs, and I will keep working to ensure that they receive the necessary resources to support their invaluable work.”
“The U.S. is a world leader in high-tech innovation and jobs. This investment will help ensure we continue to build on our record of achieving advancements in quantum computing research and development and the high-paying jobs it creates,” said Senator Steve Daines.
DOE's “Quantum Information Science and Research Infrastructure” $30 million funding opportunity is focused on developing advanced capabilities for synthesizing, constructing, and understanding quantum structures and phenomena, as well as making these capabilities available to the greater scientific community via access to DOE’s five Nanoscale Science Research Centers (NSRCs).
The five NSRCs were established by DOE's Basic Energy Sciences (BES) program in the Office of Science, and provide access to leading-edge synthesis, characterization, computational tools, and scientific expertise. Their research supports DOE's mission to advance the energy, economic, and national security of the United States.
All five NSRCs will be selected based on peer review, and eligible to lead applications for awards of up to three years. DOE’s Office of Basic Energy Sciences, which is funding the effort, envisions awards both for single NSRCs and NSRCs working in partnerships or teams.

New Major Interventions to Block Encrypted Communications of Criminal Networks

Judicial and law enforcement authorities in Belgium, France and the Netherlands have in close cooperation enabled major interventions to block the further use of encrypted communications by large-scale organised crime groups (OCGs), with the support of Europol and Eurojust. The continuous monitoring of the illegal Sky ECC communication service tool by investigators in the three countries involved has provided invaluable insights into hundreds of millions of messages exchanged between criminals. This has resulted in the collection of crucial information on over a hundred of planned large-scale criminal operations, preventing potential life threatening situations and possible victims.
During an action day, a large number of arrests were made, as well as numerous house searches and seizures in Belgium and the Netherlands.  The operation is an essential part of the continuous effort of judiciary and law enforcement in the EU and third countries to disrupt the illegal use of encrypted communications, as was already displayed last year following the successful de-encryption of the EncroChat communication platform.
As of mid-February, authorities have been able to monitor the information flow of approximately 70 000 users of Sky ECC. Many users of EncroChat changed over to the popular Sky ECC platform, after EncroChat was unveiled in 2020.
By successfully unlocking the encryption of Sky ECC, the information acquired will provide insights into criminal  activities in various EU Member States and beyond and will assist in expanding investigations and solving serious and cross-border organised crime for the coming months, possibly years.
Law enforcement in all three countries has been on a continuous stand by during the last month to be able to provide rapid reactions to possible dangerous criminal activities when required. The newly acquired information will now be analysed further
Investigations into the tool started in Belgium, after mobile phones seized during searches showed the use of Sky ECC  by suspects. Worldwide, approximately 170 000 individuals use the tool, which has its own infrastructure and applications and is operated from the United States and Canada, using computer servers based in  Europe. On a global scale, around three million messages are being exchanged each day via Sky ECC. Over 20 percent of the users are based in Belgium and the Netherlands.
Europol has and will continue to provide the authorities of Belgium, Netherlands and other affected countries with tactical, technical and financial support and will be dealing with this important flow of information on criminal activities in order to prevent threats to life and major crimes.
Eurojust has provided advice and support regarding cross-border judicial cooperation and organised 12 coordination meetings to enable this collaboration. The Agency will continue to provide this support and stands ready for further advice and cross-border operational financial support to all Member States and countries involved, to ensure an adequate cross-border judicial cooperation.

CISA Announce Transfer of .gov Top-Level Dommain from US General Services Administration

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) announced it will begin overseeing the .gov top-level domain (TLD) in April 2021. CISA is working closely with the U.S. General Services Administration, who currently oversees the TLD, to ensure a seamless transition of daily operations for .gov customers.
“Using .gov and increasing trust that government communications are authentic will improve our collective cybersecurity,” said Eric Goldstein, Executive Assistant Director for CISA’s Cybersecurity Division. “People see a .gov website or email address and know they are interacting with an official, U.S.-based government organization. Using .gov also provides security benefits, like two-factor authentication on the .gov registrar and notifications of DNS changes to administrators, over other TLDs. We’ll endeavor to make the TLD more secure for the American public and harder for malicious actors to impersonate.”
.gov is one of the six original TLDs in the internet’s domain name system (DNS). The TLD is actively used by each branch of the federal government, every state in the nation, hundreds of counties and cities, and many tribes and territories as they serve the public on the internet. The DOTGOV Act of 2020 shifted responsibility for managing .gov to CISA as the nation’s civilian cybersecurity agency.
Because the TLD is central to the availability and integrity of thousands of online services relied upon by millions of users, .gov is critical infrastructure for governments throughout the country and all aspects of its administration have cybersecurity significance. Under the actions required by the Act, CISA will work to increase security and decrease complexity for our government partners.

Joint NSA and CISA Guidance on Strengthening Cyber Defense Through Protective DNS

The National Security Agency (NSA) and CISA have released a Joint Cybersecurity Information (CSI) sheet with guidance on selecting a protective Domain Name System (PDNS) service as a key defense against malicious cyber activity. Protective DNS can greatly reduce the effectiveness of ransomware, phishing, botnet, and malware campaigns by blocking known-malicious domains. Additionally organizations can use DNS query logs for incident response and threat hunting activities.
CISA encourages users and administrators to consider the benefits of using a protective DNS service and review NSA and CISA’s CSI sheet on Selecting a Protective DNS Service for more information.
Protecting users’ DNS queries is a key defense because cyber threat actors use domain names across the network exploitation lifecycle: users frequently mistype domain names while attempting to navigate to a known-good website and unintentionally go to a malicious one instead (T1583.001); threat actors lace phishing emails with malicious links (T1566.002); a compromised device may seek commands from a remote command and control server (TA0011); a threat actor may exfiltrate data from a compromised device to a remote host (TA0010).1 The domain names associated with malicious content are often known or knowable, and preventing their resolution protects individual users and the enterprise.
Due to the centrality of DNS for cybersecurity, the Department of Defense (DoD) included DNS filtering as a requirement in its Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) standard (SC.3.192). The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued a memo and directive requiring U.S. government organizations to take steps to mitigate related DNS issues. Additionally, the National Security Agency has published guidance documents on defending DNS [1, 2, 3].
This guidance outlines the benefits and risks of using a protective DNS service and assesses several commercial PDNS providers based on reported capabilities. The assessment is meant to serve as information for organizations, not as recommendations for provider selection. Users of these services must evaluate their architectures and specific needs when choosing a service for PDNS and then validate that a provider meets those needs.

GAO report finds DOD's weapons programs lack clear cybersecurity guidelines

DOD's network of sophisticated, expensive weapon systems must work when needed, without being incapacitated by cyberattacks. However, GAO reported in 2018 that DOD was routinely finding cyber vulnerabilities late in its development process.
A Senate report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's implementation of cybersecurity for weapon systems in development. GAO's report addresses (1) the extent to which DOD has made progress in implementing cybersecurity for weapon systems during development, and (2) the extent to which DOD and the military services have developed guidance for incorporating weapon systems cybersecurity requirements into contracts.
Since GAO's 2018 report, the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken action to make its network of high-tech weapon systems less vulnerable to cyberattacks. DOD and military service officials highlighted areas of progress, including increased access to expertise, enhanced cyber testing, and additional guidance. For example, GAO found that selected acquisition programs have conducted, or planned to conduct, more cybersecurity testing during development than past acquisition programs. It is important that DOD sustain its efforts as it works to improve weapon systems cybersecurity.
Contracting for cybersecurity requirements is key. DOD guidance states that these requirements should be treated like other types of system requirements and, more simply, “if it is not in the contract, do not expect to get it.” Specifically, cybersecurity requirements should be defined in acquisition program contracts, and criteria should be established for accepting or rejecting the work and for how the government will verify that requirements have been met. However, GAO found examples of program contracts omitting cybersecurity requirements, acceptance criteria, or verification processes. For example, GAO found that contracts for three of the five programs did not include any cybersecurity requirements when they were awarded. A senior DOD official said standardizing cybersecurity requirements is difficult and the department needs to better communicate cybersecurity requirements and systems engineering to the users that will decide whether or not a cybersecurity risk is acceptable.
DOD and the military services have developed a range of policy and guidance documents to improve weapon systems cybersecurity, but the guidance usually does not specifically address how acquisition programs should include cybersecurity requirements, acceptance criteria, and verification processes in contracts. Among the four military services GAO reviewed, only the Air Force has issued service-wide guidance that details how acquisition programs should define cybersecurity requirements and incorporate those requirements in contracts. The other services could benefit from a similar approach in developing their own guidance that helps ensure that DOD appropriately addresses cybersecurity requirements in contracts.
GAO is recommending that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps provide guidance on how programs should incorporate tailored cybersecurity requirements into contracts. DOD concurred with two recommendations, and stated that the third—to the Marine Corps—should be merged with the one to the Navy. DOD's response aligns with the intent of the recommendation.

CISA Issues Emergency Directive for Federal Agencies to Patch Critical Vulnerability

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued Emergency Directive (ED) 21-02 requiring federal civilian departments and agencies running Microsoft Exchange on-premises products to update or disconnect the products from their networks until updated with the Microsoft patch released yesterday.  It also requires agencies who are currently able to do so to collect forensic images. All agencies are also required to search for known indicators of compromise after patching, and if indicators are found, contact CISA to begin incident response activities.  The directive is in response to observed active exploitation of these products using previously unknown vulnerabilities.  CISA also issued an activity alert to provide additional information and to encourage other public and private sector organizations to take steps to protect their networks.
“This Emergency Directive will help us secure federal networks against the immediate threat while CISA works with its interagency partners to better understand the malicious actor’s techniques and motivations to share with our stakeholders,” said Acting CISA Director Brandon Wales.  “The swiftness with which CISA issued this Emergency Directive reflects the seriousness of this vulnerability and the importance of all organizations – in government and the private sector – to take steps to remediate it.”
ED 21-02 reflects CISA’s determination that exploitations that pose an unacceptable risk to the federal civilian executive branch agencies require emergency action.  CISA made this assessment on the basis of 1) current exploitation of these vulnerabilities, 2) the likelihood of widespread exploitation of the vulnerabilities after public disclosure and the risk that federal government services to the American public could be degraded.
CISA and the National Security Agency worked with Microsoft and security researchers to identify detection and mitigation approaches to these vulnerabilities, for which Microsoft released the patch this afternoon.  Cloud services such as Microsoft 365 and Azure systems are not known to be affected by this vulnerability.

NSCAI Report presents strategy for winning the artificial intelligence era

The 16 chapters in the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) Main Report provide topline conclusions and recommendations. The accompanying Blueprints for Action outline more detailed steps that the U.S. Government should take to implement the recommendations.
The NSCAI acknowledges how much remains to be discovered about AI and its future applications. Nevertheless, enough is known about AI today to begin with two convictions.
First, the rapidly improving ability of computer systems to solve problems and to perform tasks that would otherwise require human intelligence—and in some instances exceed human performance—is world altering. AI technologies are the most powerful tools in generations for expanding knowledge, increasing prosperity, and enriching the human experience. AI is also the quintessential “dual-use” technology. The ability of a machine to perceive, evaluate, and act more quickly and accurately than a human represents a competitive advantage in any field—civilian or military. AI technologies will be a source of enormous power for the companies and countries that harness them.
Second, AI is expanding the window of vulnerability the United States has already entered. For the first time since World War II, America’s technological predominance—the backbone of its economic and military power—is under threat. China possesses the might, talent, and ambition to surpass the United States as the world’s leader in AI in the next decade if current trends do not change. Simultaneously, AI is deepening the threat posed by cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns that Russia, China, and others are using to infiltrate our society, steal our data, and interfere in our democracy. The limited uses of AI-enabled attacks to date represent the tip of the iceberg. Meanwhile, global crises exemplified by the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change highlight the need to expand our conception of national security and find innovative AI-enabled solutions.
Given these convictions, the Commission concludes that the United States must act now to field AI systems and invest substantially more resources in AI innovation to protect its security, promote its prosperity, and safeguard the future of democracy.
Full report is available at https://reports.nscai.gov/final-report
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