OSCE expands access to its technical guidance on the physical security of critical infrastructure

The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat and the OSCE Transnational Threats Department launched the Turkmen version of their Technical Guide on Physical Security Considerations for Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorist Attacks. The launch event was accompanied by a training course on enhancing the physical security of critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, using the Technical Guide as a training aid.
Developed under the OSCE’s Project PROTECT with support from Germany and the United States of America, the Technical Guide provides practical guidance to policymakers, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and security practitioners on enhancing the protection of critical infrastructure sites from terrorist attacks. The publication consolidates publicly available practices and examples from across the OSCE area and is designed to support stakeholders in developing security measures tailored to their specific risk environment. It was released in November 2025 in the English and Russian. The launch of the Turkmen language version of this Guide, initiated by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, is a testament to the Guide's growing value in OSCE participating States.
A representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkmenistan presented the country's approach to protecting critical infrastructure, highlighting current practices, the national legislative framework and ongoing efforts to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure.
The training course brought together government officials responsible for critical infrastructure protection to strengthen their understanding of physical security principles and practices. Participants examined approaches to security system design as well as technical measures including perimeter protection, intrusion detection systems, security lighting, video surveillance, access control and security screening. During the event, participants explored practical ways to apply the Guide’s principles through security assessments, emergency planning, business continuity measures and training exercises.
“The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe serves as a vital pillar in global counter-terrorism efforts by actively strengthening the resilience and protection of critical infrastructure across its 57 participating States. Bearing in mind that security is not a task for a single agency or nation, we designed this training programme to build our collective resilience. It is our firm belief that this programme, together with the Guide, will strengthen inter-agency communication and help upgrade security protocols to more effectively protect critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks,” said William Leaf, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.
The event featured contributions from international experts and practitioners, as well as the Government of Kazakhstan, another key stakeholder in the OSCE’s Project PROTECT. A representative of the Anti-Terrorism Centre of the Committee of National Security of the Republic of Kazakhstan delivered a presentation on the country's approach to protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist threats.
The event forms part of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat's project Building Capacity of Law Enforcement and Security Officials of Turkmenistan in Countering Transnational Threats Related to Organized Crime and Terrorism – 2026 and the OSCE's extrabudgetary Project PROTECT, which supports participating States in strengthening national approaches to protecting vulnerable targets from terrorist threats and other hazards.

INTERPOL report finds AI linked to more than half of cybercrime in Africa

Artificial intelligence is enabling 55 per cent of reported cybercrimes across Africa making attacks faster, more scalable, and increasingly difficult for victims and platforms to detect, according to INTERPOL’s African Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2026.

With more than 1.1 billion mobile subscribers recorded in 2025, Africa’s digital transformation is expanding rapidly.

However, cybercrime legislation is fragmented and AI readiness in law enforcement agencies remains alarmingly low.

The 40-page report draws on survey data from 36 African member countries and highlights a defining shift: cyber-criminality has evolved from isolated incidents into an industrialized, borderless ecosystem.

East Africa emerged as a hub of mobile money fraud and infrastructure-targeted ransomware.

Business email compromise and romance scams targeting both corporate and individual victims were prolific in Central and West Africa.

Southern Africa’s ultra-high connectivity makes it a magnet for global threat actors seeking maximum disruption.

The financial toll of cybercrime in Africa is significant.

Since 2024, cybercrime-related losses have more than doubled, from USD 192 million to USD 484 million, driven primarily by AI-facilitated scams, credential harvesting, and automated social engineering campaigns.

According to the report, in 2025, online scams continued to be the most reported type of cybercrime, with attackers leveraging mobile money platforms, social media and AI to reach their targets.

Notably, 72 per cent of surveyed countries reported the presence of scam centres, with the highest concentration in Southern and West Africa.

AI-enabled cyberthreats
Digital sextortion and online harassment, often facilitated by AI-generated deepfakes and synthetic media, remained pervasive, with some 600,000 sextortion detections recorded by TrendAI, one of several partners working with INTERPOL.

Similarly, the sophistication of Business E-Mail Compromise (BEC) schemes increased dramatically, with AI used to generate highly convincing e-mail correspondence, with Africa-based threat actors targeting victims in Europe and North America using infrastructure located across multiple jurisdictions.

The report reveals that the absence of real-time, inter-agency data sharing between banks, telecoms and law enforcement creates a dangerous blind spot in efforts to combat financial fraud.

This vulnerability is being exploited by criminals who have moved beyond simply stealing existing credentials to creating entirely synthetic identities.

Combining real personal data with fabricated elements, these AI-generated digital personas can bypass even advanced biometric verification systems and have been used to open bank accounts, secure mobile loans and register SIM cards under false names.

Neal Jetton, Director of INTERPOL’s Cybercrime unit said, “Cybercrime has emerged as one of the most significant criminal threats to the region. AI is automating every stage of a cyberattack from reconnaissance and phishing to extortion and evasion.

“However, we see that when countries work together, cybercriminal infrastructure can be identified, disrupted and dismantled.”

Meaningful transnational progress is visible. In 2025, 17 countries enacted or amended cybercrime legislation, including the launch of an online reporting platform in Senegal aimed at enhancing the response to online violations affecting children.

At the same time, regionally coordinated capacity building initiatives continue to strengthen long-term cyber resilience.

Operational cooperation is also delivering noteworthy results.

Four high impact cybercrime operations coordinated by INTERPOL including Operation Serengeti 2.0, Operation Contender 3.0, Operation Sentinel and Operation Red Card 2.0 collectively led to more than 1,500 arrests, the seizure of hundreds of devices and the recovery of over USD 100 million.

In its recommendations, the report calls for standardized digital forensic capabilities, enhanced cross-border cooperation, investment in AI literacy among law enforcement officers and formal-public private partnership to support effective prevention, detection and response.

CISA Urges Water and Wastewater Systems Sector to Protect OT Against Activity Targeting PLCs

CISA is currently observing a significant increase in cyber threat actors targeting programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in the Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector. CISA urges critical infrastructure owners, operators, and integrators to remove publicly exposed PLCs and other operational technology (OT) from the internet as soon as possible. Threat actors targeting exposed PLCs have modified passwords to lock out operators and disconnected the PLCs by changing their IP addresses. This activity has resulted in boil water notices and sustained manual operations.

These threat actors are targeting water entities of all sizes. Even water organizations with mature cybersecurity processes should validate their external connections, as this targeting activity includes cellular modems installed by operators, vendors, or system integrators that may not be documented or included in routine attack surface scans. OT assets exposed to the internet have an increased risk of defacement, configuration changes, operational disruptions, and, in severe cases, physical damage.

CISA recommends organizations implement the following mitigations:

- Disconnect the PLC from the internet. Remote access for operational purposes should go through a VPN or gateway device, not directly to the PLC.
- Enable password protection and change default passwords.
- Allowlist IPs to only allow remote access from known engineering laptops or other critical OT assets.

After disconnecting PLCs from the internet, operators should ensure they have a known clean backup of the PLC image in case they are locked out by a modified password. Note: Owners, operators, and integrators of Rockwell Automation MicroLogix 1400 PLCs should see Rockwell Automation’s IMPORTANT NOTICE: Restoring Access to a MicroLogix™ 1400 Controller When the Password Is Unknown for guidance addressing this activity.

To securely enable remote access to your OT systems, CISA recommends system owners, operators, and integrators see the following resources for guidance:

- CISA: Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology
- United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Center: Secure Connectivity Principles for Operational Technology
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): Malicious Cyber Actors Targeting Water and Wastewater Sector Internet Facing Programmable Logic Controllers, Causing Operational Disruptions

For additional support, contact the Environmental Protection Agency’s Cybersecurity Technical Assistance Program for the Water Sector.

Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy (DOE), United States Cyber Command – Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) released an updated joint Cybersecurity Advisory Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure.

This update re-emphasizes the ongoing threat from Iranian-affiliated advanced persistent threat (APT) actors targeting internet-connected operational technology (OT) devices, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs) manufactured by Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley, Schneider Electric, Siemens, and potentially other brands/manufacturers. These attacks have resulted in operational disruptions and financial losses across multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Services and Facilities, Water and Wastewater Systems, and Energy.

What’s New in This Update:

• Expanded Targeting: The advisory now includes observed targeting of Schneider Electric and Siemens PLCs, in addition to Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley and potentially other branded/manufacturer devices.
• Updated Technical Details: New information on threat actor tactics, including use of configuration software to exfiltrate device project files, and expanded details on targeted ports and device models.
• Enhanced Mitigations: Additional recommendations for securing cellular modems, implementing isolated architectures, validating project files, and detecting malicious changes in reusable code modules (such as Add-On Instructions/AOIs).
• New Indicators of Compromise (IOCs): Updated tables of internet protocol (IP) addresses and timeframes associated with Iranian-affiliated APT activity.

Iranian-affiliated APT actors continue to adapt their tactics, targeting a wider range of devices and sectors. Proactive review of this advisory and implementation of the recommended mitigations are critical to defending your organization’s OT assets and ensuring operational resilience.

NATO PA Promotes Investment in Collective Defence, Infrastructure Protection

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has highlighted legislators’ vital role in ensuring the Atlantic Alliance faces up to pressing security challenges, strengthening collective defence and protecting against hybrid threats.
The Assembly’s Spring Session drew over 230 lawmakers from NATO and partner nations. Discussions on the second day focused on issues ranging from safeguarding critical infrastructure, maintaining military force levels and fast-tracking defence innovation
“The war in Ukraine is driving new thinking about modern warfare,” explained US Congressman Rick Larsen. “Innovating quickly is important but integrating and scaling new technologies is just as essential.
Drawing on Ukraine’s experience of fast-paced wartime innovation, Larsen said NATO must work urgently to overcome years of underinvestment, insufficient and fragmented demand, slow procurement and overly bureaucratic acquisition systems.
“That’s where we come in,” he told fellow parliamentarians. “We control the budgets. We conduct oversight. We can demand answers when promising technologies stall. We can push governments to integrate NATO commitments into national legislation and procurement systems that work.”
A presentation by Greek member Spyridon Kyriakis centred on shaping NATO’s future forces by improved recruitment, retention of experienced military personnel and strengthening the will to fight within Allied societies.
Faced with an aggressive, expansionist Russia on its doorstep, NATO must take steps to meet recruitment targets and ensure personnel stay in uniform longer, particularly those with critical skills such as cyber, intelligence, logistics and special operations.
“We need a sweeping renewed conversation on how we value, support and inspire our forces,” Kyriakis told the Assembly.
New NATO defence plans, bigger budgets and arms acquisition “can only deliver real deterrence if the Alliance has the well-trained, highly motivated men and women needed to operate and sustain them,” he added.
Lawmakers debated the costs and benefits of conscription and emphasised the importance of building on Ukraine’s experience to build public support and societal resilience to shape mobilisation capacity and wartime outcomes.
“As parliamentarians ... we hold the levers of oversight, the power of legislation and the loudest microphones to champion the profound value of military service to our citizens,” Kyriakis concluded.
Ahead of July’s summit of NATO leaders in Ankara, lawmakers highlighted the role of parliaments in ensuring that Allies stick to the goal of spending at least 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence and security.
“There is still much to be done to bring defence spending to 5% of GDP and transfer that money into actual operational deterrence and defence capabilities,” said Dutch Senator Bart Kroon. “Sustaining that level of spending and transformation will require trade-offs and smart policymaking.”
NATO PA speakers underscored the need to protect critical infrastructure, such as undersea and space assets, from the mounting risk of hybrid attacks.
“Allied security is increasingly dependent upon our space systems and undersea infrastructure,” stated US Congressman Mike Turner. “They are core components of our defence posture and our economic resilience; and are under growing pressure from our adversaries.”
Turner and British Member Lord Nigel Dodds made presentations urging better monitoring and attribution of threats to infrastructure, faster repair and replacement options and solutions that allow forces to operate when communications are degraded by adversaries. Cooperation with the private sector is essential.
“Parliaments and we, as parliamentarians, have an important role to play,” said Dodds. “We can help ensure that national legal frameworks are fit for purpose. We can scrutinise whether governments have clear lead authorities and effective coordination structures. We can support dedicated funding for protection, repair, and response; and we can help keep political attention on this issue before a major disruption occurs.”

CoESS calls for exclusion of Private Security Services from EU Inc. Regulation

The Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) has published a new position paper raising concerns about the European Commission’s proposal for an EU Inc. Regulation. While the proposal aims to simplify cross-border company operations in the EU, CoESS warns that it could unintentionally weaken national security frameworks and create loopholes in the regulation of private security services.
According to CoESS, private security services are already excluded from the EU Services Directive due to their direct link to internal security, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and support for law enforcement and emergency services. The organisation argues that the proposed EU Inc. framework — with rapid digital incorporation, EU-wide company recognition, and limits on additional national requirements — could make it easier for companies to circumvent national licensing and supervision systems. This would create enforcement challenges for national authorities and increase risks related to unlawful competition and weaker oversight.
The paper highlights that private security regulation differs significantly between Member States, reflecting national public security needs and operational realities. CoESS therefore believes that Member States must retain full control over authorising and supervising companies operating in this sensitive sector. The organisation also warns that the proposal could indirectly undermine the exclusion of private security services from the EU Services Directive by facilitating cross-border operations outside national regulatory frameworks.
CoESS is therefore calling on EU policymakers to explicitly exclude private security services from the scope of the future EU Inc. Regulation. The organisation stresses that such an exclusion is necessary to preserve effective enforcement of national security law and maintain robust supervision of services linked to public safety and Critical Infrastructure Protection.

NIST SP 1800-41, Responding to and Recovering from a Cyber Attack

The NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) has released the initial public draft of NIST Special Publication 1800-41, Responding to and Recovering from a Cyber Attack: Cybersecurity for the Manufacturing Sector, which provides guidelines on response and recovery activities in an industrial control system (ICS) environment and recommendations to improve operational resilience. The comment period for this publication is open through July 8, 2026.
Background
As Operational Technology (OT) systems like ICS become more interconnected with IT networks, they are increasingly being targeted by cyber threats, putting factory operations, safety, and property at risk. Organizations operating these systems, such as those in the manufacturing sector, need to have plans and capabilities in place to respond to cyber incidents and restore operations to improve overall resilience.
The NCCoE worked with 11 industry collaborators to develop reference architectures, describe response and recovery scenarios, and demonstrate relevant approaches and capabilities.
This draft publication provides actionable guidelines on responding to and recovering from cyber attacks in manufacturing environments. Discover how to:
- Understand the risks and potential impact of cyber incidents on your operations
- Develop a comprehensive response and recovery plan
- Implement best practices to minimize downtime and restore operations quickly

IAEA Director General Visits Gulf Region to Strengthen Nuclear Safety and Cooperation

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia following the recent drone attack on the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, reinforcing nuclear safety, security and regional cooperation.
During his visit to Kuwait, Mr Grossi met with Foreign Minister Sheikh Jarrah Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah to discuss regional developments and the IAEA’s support to countries in strengthening nuclear safety, security, emergency preparedness and response.
The discussions also highlighted cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, including applications in health, food security and environmental protection.
Mr Grossi also visited the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR), where he saw efforts using nuclear science to support environmental protection.
At KISR, he also received updates on joint cooperation, including research being carried out aboad the vessel Al-Mostakshif under the IAEA’s NUTEC Plastics initiative to assess threats to marine ecosystems.
During his visit to the GCC Emergency Management Centre, discussions focused on regional cooperation in emergency preparedness and response, as well as on strengthening coordination mechanisms during nuclear or radiological emergencies.
In Doha, DG Grossi met with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, to discuss regional developments, including issues related to Iran’s nuclear programme, reaffirm the importance of dialogue, diplomacy and international cooperation.
In Abu Dhabi, Mr Grossi met with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan to discuss nuclear safety in the country and in the region following the 17 May drone strike on the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant.
The discussions also covered the growing role of nuclear energy in supporting energy security and economic development, along with emerging technologies such as advanced reactors and small modular reactors.
In his visit to the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, he commended the response by the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation following the drone attack and reaffirmed the IAEA’s support for nuclear safety and security in the UAE and the wider region.
He also met plant personnel and highlighted the importance of preparedness, resilience and transparency in ensuring the safe operation of the facility.
In Saudi Arabia, Mr Grossi met with Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman to discuss the Kingdom’s advancing civilian nuclear programme and the IAEA’s support for its safe, secure and transparent development.
Advancing Cooperation
Throughout the visit, Mr Grossi emphasized the importance of international cooperation, strong safety and security frameworks and the responsible use of nuclear science and technology to support development, energy security, environmental protection and human health.

JRC identifies key opportunities for critical raw material recovery

Waste from different sources, including batteries, vehicles and electrical equipment, has great potential for the recovery and recycling of critical raw materials, a new JRC report shows.
Critical raw materials are essential elements of key technologies, from electric vehicles and wind turbines, to drones and smartphones. Currently, the EU is highly dependent on third countries for their supply. As the demand for such technologies is expected to surge, this will put immense pressure on securing access to critical raw materials.
By improving waste collection and processing, the EU can recover strategic raw materials domestically. The production of secondary strategic and critical raw materials, as well as extending the lifetime of products, can reduce dependency on third countries and support the transition to a more circular economy.
A new JRC report identifies a list of products, components and waste streams that could have a significant circularity potential for critical and strategic raw materials, such as permanent magnets from wind turbines, cobalt and lithium in electric vehicle batteries, and aluminium parts in vehicles.
The list, a step forward under the Critical Raw Materials Act, will help EU countries prioritise key waste streams for recoverability and help identify gaps in current waste treatment systems. It also highlights challenges and opportunities for a more circular and strategically independent raw materials’ value chain.
From waste to resource
The analysis highlights current gaps in treatment of waste from specific products. For example, small electrical and electronic equipment account for significant losses of strategic and critical raw materials: 46% of the total strategic and critical raw materials in these products is lost in collection. Yet, common household items, such as hard disk drives and cables could have a significant recovery potential, if well-collected and treated.
Moreover, the report shows that critical raw materials used in electric vehicle batteries and wind turbines - the very technologies which power the shift to cleaner energy - are often not sufficiently recovered, leading to a major loss of critical raw materials when these products reach the end of their life.
Similarly, permanent magnets used in wind turbines tend to get lost in bulk steel and aluminium waste flows, rather than being recovered separately, despite their strategic importance. Losses are projected to jump from 1.9 thousand tonnes per year in 2022 to around 45 thousand tonnes per year in 2030, when the first large wave of turbines reaches their end-of-life.
Towards a more circular economy 
The Critical Raw Materials Act requires EU countries to develop national circularity programmes that target specific waste streams. This report supports the Implementing Act of Article 26 of the Critical Raw Materials Act, and helps governments put in place effective programmes by making it easier to spot gaps in existing legislation, processes and data, and to harness circularity potential.
By keeping critical and strategic materials within the continent, the EU can improve the circular economy and EU competitiveness, while reducing exposure to supply disruptions.

CISA Announces Revised Town Hall Schedule to Engage with Stakeholders on Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) today announced a revised schedule for a series of virtual town hall meetings to gather stakeholder input on the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) rulemaking. Scheduled to begin June 15, these town hall meetings replace the town hall meetings previously scheduled for March and April 2026, but which CISA was not able to hold due to the recent Democrat shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
CISA remains committed to affording stakeholders the opportunity to provide additional input on the CIRCIA rulemaking through a town hall series before the rule is finalized. The revised schedule is available in the Federal Register. Interested stakeholders may register for the town hall meetings at www.cisa.gov/circia. Any changes or updates to the town halls will be available on www.cisa.gov/circia.
“CISA is working to maximize the impact of CIRCIA to significantly improve our Nation’s cybersecurity posture. At the same time, CISA values the interest and concern our stakeholders have that CIRCIA will be implemented with minimal unnecessary burden to entities in critical infrastructure sectors,” said CISA Acting Director Nick Andersen. “CISA appreciates our stakeholder’s patience with waiting for our rescheduled town hall meetings to provide their critical input as we finalize this rule. As an agency built on collaboration and coordination, CISA is committed to hearing from the American people, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other community members.”
CIRCIA is a U.S. law that will help the government quickly respond to cyber threats and share information to protect critical infrastructure. Once the final rule is implemented, covered organizations will be required to report certain cyber incidents to CISA within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours.
CISA has received numerous requests for additional engagement on the CIRCIA rulemaking process and greatly values its stakeholders’ interest in shaping a final rule that maximizes CIRCIA’s impact on our Nation’s cybersecurity posture while minimizing unnecessary burden. Given the broad stakeholder community that CIRCIA may potentially impact, CISA will conduct a series of town hall meetings to solicit input on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). CISA selected this approach to gather additional engagement on the CIRCIA NPRM to provide access to CISA across the broad range of entities within the critical infrastructure sectors.
CISA issued the CIRCIA NPRM in April 2024. To inform the CIRCIA NPRM, CISA hosted in-person public listening sessions across the country, conducted virtual sector-specific sessions, and engaged with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) and other federal partners—all aimed at gathering meaningful input from a broad range of stakeholders. The NPRM was open for a 90-day public comment period.
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